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Abstract 
A persistent wage gap exists between women and men in the United States 
(Catalyst, 2015; Hegewisch, Ellis, & Hartmann, 2015). Although the reasons 
behind the wage gap are extremely complex, one of the methods through which 
pay equity may be reached could involve altering the way people approach their 
goals at the bargaining table, especially since women tend to underperform 
relative to men in salary negotiations (Mazei, Hüffmeier, Freund, Stuhlmacher, 
Bilke, & Hertel, 2015). Salary negotiations represent a critical piece of the pay 
equity puzzle, particularly when individuals are starting their careers. If equally 
qualified men and women begin their careers negotiating different starting 
salaries, what may begin as a small difference in pay snowballs to a significant 
difference in lifetime earnings, and that does not account for other factors like 
promotions or bonuses. The present study found evidence that supports the use of 
a motivational intervention for salary negotiations derived from regulatory focus 
theory (RFT) to reduce gender differences in salary negotiation outcomes. 
Specifically, women in the role of a job candidate who were told to consciously 
frame a salary negotiation as an opportunity and instructed to use an eagerness 
strategy (i.e., focus on attaining one’s aspiration salary value) achieved better 
negotiated outcomes (i.e., first offer, starting salary) compared to a condition 
where no specific strategy was assigned. There was also a main effect of the 
eagerness strategy on first offers and final negotiated salary. The current research 
also integrated the existing literature on gender differences in negotiation. Women 
in the eagerness strategy condition anticipated less backlash (i.e., social penalties 
2 
 
due to violations of traditional gender role norms) for negotiating compared to the 
control condition. Lastly, priming job candidates’ regulatory strategy (i.e., 
eagerness strategy versus control condition) was tested for its role in subjective 
outcomes such as feelings of satisfaction with the negotiation and perceptions of 
one’s counterpart.  Individuals in the eagerness strategy condition did not differ in 
their satisfaction with negotiated outcomes (i.e., salary), the negotiation process, 
perceptions of their own competence, and perceptions of their counterpart 
compared to the control condition. 
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Introduction 
 Negotiation represents a process that occurs in a variety of contexts. 
Individuals engage in negotiation when they discuss their salary and benefits at a 
new job, bargain with sellers at antique shows, conduct business-to-business 
transactions, and allocate domestic responsibilities. As such, it is important that 
people are effective at conducting negotiations, whether they be formal or 
informal, to attain desired goals and outcomes.  
An area of increasing research concerns the role of self-regulation as a 
mechanism through which negotiators execute their bargaining strategy and 
achieve their goals (Galinsky, Leonardelli, Okhuysen, & Mussweiler, 2005; 
Appelt, Zou, Arora, & Higgins, 2009; Appelt & Higgins, 2010). Broadly, self-
regulation comprises a set of cognitive processes that guide an individual’s 
thoughts, behaviors, and emotions while pursuing desired end states, or goals 
(Bandura, 1991; Kanfer, 1990).  Within the last decade, negotiation scholars have 
begun examining the role of regulatory focus, which describes the manner in 
which individuals pursue their goals using either approach focused mindsets that 
view tasks as opportunities for advancement and growth, thus framing the pursuit 
of goals in terms of gains, or avoidance focused mindsets that view tasks as 
responsibilities, duties, or obligations and thus frame goal pursuit in terms of 
avoiding losses (Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Higgins, 1998; Higgins, Friedman, 
Harlow, Idson, Ayduk, & Taylor, 2001).  Recent research applying regulatory 
focus to negotiation has found that there may be general advantages to adopting 
the gain framing common to the promotion focus, while the loss avoidance 
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strategy common to the prevention focus could be advantageous under different 
circumstances (e.g., individuals have very high goals) (Galinsky et al., 2005; 
Trotschel et al., 2013). One interesting arena where some theories of self-
regulation have been applied but have yet to incorporate recent developments in 
the literature concerns gender differences in negotiation.  
 Women in particular may benefit from an intervention that could alleviate 
distractions to goal pursuit during negotiation. Since women still only hold 5.2% 
of Fortune 500 CEO positions and are only earning an estimated $0.82 for every 
dollar paid to men, organizations and scholars alike must consider opportunities to 
help qualified women achieve equal outcomes relative to their male counterparts 
(Catalyst, 2017; Hegewisch, Ellis, & Hartmann, 2015). Women do not report 
setting any less ambitious career goals compared to men, yet they are less likely 
to hold senior management positions, have people directly reporting to them, and 
report feeling less satisfied with their careers compared to men (Ely, Stone, & 
Ammerman, 2014).  
Women’s lower average performance in salary negotiations compared to 
men is often cited as a contributing factor to the gender pay gap (Amanatullah & 
Tinsley, 2013; Bowles & McGinn, 2008; Kulik & Olekalns, 2012; Mazei et al., 
2015). One of the biggest reasons why a self-regulation intervention may be 
preferable to other interventions is that women are not overtly instructed to alter 
their behavior in any way. Rather, the way in which individuals are instructed to 
pursue their goals is manipulated such that women’s tendency to fear or avoid 
stereotypically masculine-typed negotiations (e.g., salary negotiation) can be 
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reduced by changing the way negotiation strategies are framed. The current 
research differs from other interventions to reduce gender differences in 
negotiation, which have largely placed the burden on women negotiators to adjust 
their behavior.  In one study, Amanatullah and Morris (2010) found that women 
who use assertive bargaining tactics receive harsher social penalties (i.e., 
backlash) and negotiate worse deals compared to women who negotiate using 
more relational tactics (i.e., negotiating on behalf of someone). The authors’ 
advice for women was to enhance the perception of the advocacy role across 
negotiations by couching requests in terms of how it may benefit others (e.g., the 
organization, subordinates).  Others have recommended that women “lean in” and 
negotiate more often, defying traditional female prescriptions for behavior by 
enhancing their ambition and commitment (Babcock & Laschever, 2003; 
Sandberg, 2013).  
Negotiation 
 Negotiation can be defined as the “deliberate interactions of two or more 
complex social units which are attempting to define or redefine the terms of their 
interdependence” (Walton & McKersie, 1965, p. 3) or “the process by which 
people with conflicting interests determine how they are going to allocate 
resources or work together in the future” (Brett, 2007, p. 1).  A key trait of 
negotiations is that they are inherently interdependent (or perceived as such), 
meaning that the desires or goals of one party influence what the other party can 
have, and vice versa.  Negotiation is an especially compelling research topic given 
that it has applications in both formal (e.g., negotiating roles for a new work 
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project) and informal settings (e.g., negotiating household chores), meaning that 
most people will be engaged in a negotiation during some time in their lives, and 
would benefit from understanding how to negotiate successfully (Pruitt & 
Carnevale, 1993).  However, there are a few core characteristics that define 
negotiation differently from other forms of conflict resolution.  Specifically, 
negotiations involve parties (i.e., individuals or groups) that have, or perceive to 
have, conflicts of interest, are engaged in communication (face-to-face or other 
mediums), are able to make compromises by making offers and counteroffers to 
one another, are part of a negotiation voluntarily (i.e., not by coercion), the 
parties’ outcomes are determined jointly, and mixed-motives exist such that both 
parties’ are motivated to compete for their own best interest as well as cooperate 
with one another (Rubin & Brown, 1975; Schelling, 1960). At a more granular 
level, negotiations are defined as either distributive or integrative in terms of their 
structure. 
Distributive versus integrative negotiations  
 One critical distinction made in negotiation research is the structure as 
either distributive or integrative.  In distributive negotiations, the interests of the 
negotiating parties are in direct opposition to one another, where the gains 
achieved by one party are directly proportional to the losses incurred by their 
counterpart (de Dreu, Beersma, Steinel, & Van Kleef, 2007; Walton & McKersie, 
1965).  One example of a distributive negotiation would be a buyer-seller, single-
issue structure for the price of a car. The price that the seller receives for the car is 
directly proportional to the money the buyer must spend (i.e., lose).  Contrary to 
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distributive negotiations, integrative negotiations typically involve multiple issues 
where negotiators’ interests may still be opposed, but the priorities may differ 
across topics and trade-offs are possible (Walton & McKersie, 1965).   
In a classic example of an integrative negotiation, two sisters are 
discussing who should get an orange, eventually agreeing to split the orange in 
half; each sister throwing out the part of the orange they didn’t want (Follett, 
1924).  At first blush, it would appear that this is a distributive negotiation (i.e., if 
one sister gets the orange, the other gets nothing; therefore, the best option would 
be to split the orange in half to distribute the resource evenly).  However, if the 
sisters had negotiated effectively, they would have discovered that one wanted the 
rind of the orange for its zest in making a cake, while the other wanted the inside 
of the fruit for juice.  To truly maximize the distribution of the resource (i.e., the 
orange), and get what they truly desired (i.e., the rind or the fruit itself, 
respectively), the sisters would have needed to communicate openly to identify 
their positions and interests.   
As you can imagine, many real-world negotiations are integrative in 
nature, but may not be perceived as such by the parties involved due the strong 
tendency to believe that most negotiation scenarios involve a finite set of goods or 
resources, and therefore one party’s gain is the other’s loss. This is called the 
“fixed-pie bias” (de Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000; Thompson & Hastie, 1990).  
The fixed-pie bias can create a set of expectations that lead negotiators to engage 
in ineffective negotiation tactics that may lead to impasse (i.e., no deal), or an 
inefficient distribution of resources like the story of the sisters and the orange.  
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Negotiated agreements can therefore be evaluated as Pareto efficient, no other 
agreement exists that would make either party better off without sacrificing 
outcomes of the other parties involved, or Pareto inefficient, where there are 
unexplored alternative deals that would benefit one party without hurting the 
other (Raiffa, Richardson, & Metcalfe, 2002).   
 One setting where negotiation skills are often put to the test in a high-
stakes environment is in salary negotiations. In salary negotiations, newly hired 
employees must balance their desire to maximize their starting salary while 
minimizing the potential of offending their new employer by coming across as too 
demanding.  On the other side of the table, employers must maximize their desire 
to satisfy the new employee’s desire for a competitive salary while minimizing 
consequences for a salary that is too high. Individuals involved in salary 
negotiations may possess a reservation value; the minimum salary the employee 
would accept or the maximum salary the employer would offer, the target value; 
the salary both employee and employer would respectively view as acceptable, 
and the aspiration value; the maximum salary the employee would like to receive 
or the minimum salary the employer would like to offer (Walton & McKersie, 
1965). In setting these values, both parties decide on a value that would constitute 
their opening offer during the negotiation. The opening offer could be different 
from the reservation, target, or aspiration values, but is typically more effective 
when it is close to the aspiration value (de Dreu, Beersma, Steinel, & Van Kleef, 
2007). One other value that may affect a salary negotiation is the BATNA (i.e., 
best alternative to a negotiated agreement), for example, another job offer (for the 
9 
 
candidate) or job candidate (for the hiring manager) exists.  Negotiators often 
consider their reservation, target, and aspiration values in conjunction with their 
BATNA.  
 It is important to note that goals in negotiation go beyond economic 
values, and also include subjective outcomes. For example, negotiators are more 
likely to report a desire to work with their counterpart in the future when they 
report feeling more satisfied with the final terms of the negotiation, trust their 
counterpart, and feel their negotiation experience was a fair process (Curhan, Xu, 
& Elfenbein, 2006). 
Therefore, an important skill in negotiation is planning (i.e., setting goals) 
and executing a strategy so negotiators can get what they desire (i.e., attain their 
goals) and feel satisfied with economic and interpersonal outcomes. One area of 
the literature that has been applied to understand this process is self-regulation. I 
will first broadly describe self-regulation, the process that drives goal selection 
and attainment, and then discuss a more specific theory of self-regulation, called 
regulatory focus theory.  
Self-regulation 
 Self-regulation, or the cognitive process through which individuals 
monitor and guide their thoughts, behaviors, and emotions over time in the 
selection and pursuit of goals (Bandura, 1991; Kanfer, 1990). A goal is defined as 
“the object or aim of an action” (Locke & Latham, 2002, p. 705), such as the 
attainment of a specific level of performance on a task within a pre-determined 
amount of time.  Goals direct behavior in that “they direct attention and effort 
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toward goal-related activities and away from goal irrelevant activities” (Locke & 
Latham, 2002, p. 705), provide an energizing function such that individuals who 
set goals commit more effort towards goal-attainment, improve persistence over 
time on goal-related activities, and affect cognition such that individuals are cued 
to apply preexisting or closely related knowledge and skills to goal-relevant tasks 
and plan strategies for goal-attainment. Self-regulation is activated when 
individuals, consciously or unconsciously, recognize a discrepancy between their 
current state and a desired state (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989). Goals are a 
representation of these desired end states to the individual, and guide the focus of 
self-regulatory activities (Vancouver & Day, 2005).   
 Although theoretical descriptions of the forces that activate and perpetuate 
self-regulation differ, they typically include the interdependent concepts of goal 
choice and goal striving. Goal choice is a process through which individuals 
select one or more goals whereas goal striving is the process through which 
individuals engage in the execution of strategies in the pursuit of attaining the 
goals they set (Diefendorff & Lord, 2008). Other researchers have broken down 
goal choice into the distinct processes of goal establishment (i.e., the adoption, 
adaptation, or rejection of goals) and planning (i.e., the preparation to pursue a 
goal) (Vancouver & Day, 2005).  Lastly, goal revision, or the process of changing 
or abandoning goals, may be utilized as goal pursuit unfolds across time and 
contexts (Austin & Vancouver, 1996).    
Theoretical frameworks developed to describe self-regulation have 
generally fallen into three camps: structure, phase, and content (Diefendorff & 
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Lord, 2008). Content theories of self-regulation, of which this research focuses 
(i.e., regulatory focus theory), are not as interested in specific mechanisms 
through which self-regulation occurs but rather how the activities or goals that 
individuals pursue affects self-regulatory processes and outcomes (c.f., Grant & 
Dweck, 1990). The current research emphasizes a theory from this family: 
Regulatory focus theory (i.e., RFT). In the following sections, I will describe 
regulatory focus theory and how it has been examined within the context of 
negotiation.  
Regulatory focus theory 
 Regulatory focus theory (RFT) is a content theory of self-regulation that 
serves to explain the mechanisms through which individuals monitor their 
cognition, affect, and behavior during goal striving (Higgins, 1997; Higgins, 
1998; Higgins et al., 2001). This operates through two coexisting concepts: 
Promotion focus and prevention focus.  Both foci relate to approach motivation 
wherein individuals strive to reduce the gap between their current and desired 
states. RFT states that a single task in which an individual sets a goal may be 
accomplished through the employment of strategies that reflect either promotion 
or prevention focus.  In general, promotion focused individuals ensure goal 
achievement while accomplishing gains while prevention focused individuals 
ensure goal achievement while minimizing losses.  As an example, two 
individuals may set the same goal (e.g., to receive an A in a college course), but 
one may view this goal as an opportunity to improve their class rank (i.e., 
promotion focus) and utilize eagerness strategies (e.g., focusing on studying 
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course materials), while the other views this goal as a requirement to maintain 
their standing in a degree program (i.e., prevention focus) and utilize vigilance 
strategies (e.g., minimizing information that is forgotten) to accomplish the goal. 
A promotion focus theoretically stems from a desire for individuals to 
fulfill nurturance needs. Nurturance needs represent an individual’s needs for 
growth, achievement, and accomplishment. Promotion focused goals typically 
revolve around ideals (i.e., hopes and aspirations) and opportunities for personal 
growth.  Additionally, a promotion focus is a motivational condition that drives 
goal striving behaviors based on the presence and absence of positive outcomes. 
Promotion focused individuals adopt goal-striving strategies that are characterized 
by “eagerness” behaviors (e.g., working consistently on project tasks, 
accumulating points in a game) (Higgins, 1997, Higgins et al., 2001).  
A prevention focus stems from a desire to fulfill security needs. Security 
needs represent an individual’s desire to fulfill their desires for protection, safety, 
and responsibility (i.e., the “ought” self). Individuals with a prevention focus 
concentrate on ought goals that are related to duties, responsibilities, and 
obligations.  A prevention focus drives goal-striving behaviors based on the 
presence and absence of negative or undesired outcomes.  Prevention focused 
individuals adopt goal-striving strategies that are characterized by “vigilance” 
behaviors (e.g., avoiding work that is unrelated to the current project, making as 
few errors as possible) (Higgins, 1997; Higgins, 1998; Higgins et al., 2001).   
Individuals can be primed to adopt a prevention or promotion focus based 
on situational framing (Higgins et al., 2001).  For example, an individual may be 
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generally prevention focused, but primed for a promotion focus while playing a 
video game where ideal, promotion-focused goals are set (e.g., accumulating a 
certain number of experience points to get to a new level in the game), and 
players are instructed to attain these goals by going on missions that help them 
achieve experience points (i.e., utilize eagerness strategies).  
A second important factor in RFT relates to the concept of regulatory fit, 
which suggests that congruence between chronic regulatory focus and the manner 
in which a goal is pursued enhance goal pursuit and task performance.  
Regulatory fit 
Based on RFT, a promotion focused individual enacts eagerness strategies 
during goal pursuit while a prevention focused individual enacts vigilance 
strategies. However, what happens when a promotion focused individual enacts a 
vigilance strategy (i.e., attain non-loss over a loss) or a prevention focused 
individual enacts an eagerness (i.e., attain gains over non-gains) strategy, either 
due to the salience of norms in a goal striving context or through direct 
instructions? According to regulatory fit theory, a direct offshoot of regulatory 
focus theory, individuals experience fit, a sensation of “feeling right”, when there 
is a match between their regulatory focus orientation (i.e., promotion or 
prevention) and the manner of pursuing a goal using eagerness or vigilance 
strategies.  Fit is enhanced for promotion focused individuals when they pursue 
goals using an eagerness compared to vigilance strategy, whereas prevention 
focused individuals experience greater fit when they employ a vigilance compared 
to an eagerness strategy (Higgins, 2000). This feeling of fit increases the 
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perceived value of goal pursuit and intensifies goal pursuit (Cesario, Grant, & 
Higgins, 2004; Higgins, 2000; Higgins 2006).  For example, Freitas and 
colleagues (2002) demonstrated that participants experienced greater task 
engagement (i.e., the extent to which participants thought a task was interesting 
and enjoyable) when the task instructions denoted fit with their chronic regulatory 
focus; promotion focused participants were more engaged when the task involved 
circling matching shapes (i.e., a task that elicits an eagerness strategy) versus 
crossing out mismatched shapes (i.e., a task that elicits a vigilance strategy) while 
prevention focused participants were more engaged when the task involved 
crossing out mismatched shapes versus circling matching shapes (Freitas, 
Liberman, Salovey, & Higgins, 2002). Regulatory fit also positively influences 
task performance, goal completion, and subjective feelings of satisfaction (Keller 
& Bless, 2006; Park, Van Dyne, & Ilgen, 2013; Spiegel, Grant-Pillow, & Higgins, 
2004).  
RFT in organizational psychology.  In a meta-analysis by Lanaj, Chang, 
and Johnson (2012), the role of regulatory focus was examined within an 
organizational context as a mediating process that links more distal factors such as 
goal orientation and personality to work-related outcomes such as task 
performance and organizational citizenship behaviors (i.e., OCBs). This comes 
from recommendations suggesting that distal traits predict performance through 
self-regulatory processes (Kanfer, 1990; 1992).  Regulatory focus was examined 
meta-analytically and explained incremental variance in task performance after 
controlling for nine other predictors (learning goal orientation, performance-
15 
 
approach goal orientation, performance-avoid goal orientation, self-efficacy, 
conscientiousness, extraversion, neuroticism, openness, agreeableness). These 
nine predictors explained 41% of the variance in task performance. Regulatory 
focus explained an additional 13% of the variance in task performance. 
Regulatory focus was also ranked the fourth most predictive variable for task 
performance in terms of relative importance, following conscientiousness, self-
efficacy, and learning goal orientation.  
Specifically, Lanaj et al., (2012) found that a promotion focus is positively 
associated with approach temperaments, including extraversion (= .36), positive 
affectivity (= .39), the behavioral activation system (= .45), learning goal 
orientation (= .47), performance approach goal orientation (= .40), and self-
efficacy (= .24).  Promotion focus was also positively associated with task 
performance (= .38), OCBs (i.e., organizational citizenship behaviors) (= .30), 
and innovative performance (= .28). 
Prevention focus was positively associated with avoidance temperaments, 
such as neuroticism (= .21), negative affectivity (= .23), behavioral inhibition 
system (= .39), and performance-avoid goal orientation (=.26).  Prevention 
focus was also positively associated with conscientiousness (= .32), and safety 
performance (= .51). 
Promotion and prevention foci are theoretically distinct and statistically 
orthogonal to one another rather than two ends of a single, bipolar continuum 
(Higgins, 1997).  Theoretically, an individual could, on average across situations, 
utilize vigilance (prevention) and eagerness (promotion) strategies during goal 
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attainment, although this effect has not yet been empirically tested.  Similar to 
non-linear or curvilinear relationships found in other research (c.f., Ferris et al., 
2011), there may be a number of work-related contexts where a focus on both 
prevention and promotion would yield optimal outcomes. Indeed, one of the 
strongest statistical relationships with both promotion and prevention focus in the 
meta-analysis by Lanaj, Chang, and Johnson (2012) was conscientiousness, a Big 
5 personality variable that consistently predicts important work-based outcomes 
such as task performance.  Therefore, when both approach and avoidance-oriented 
goal strategies are employed, motivation strength and performance may be 
optimized (Barrick, Mount, & Judge, 2001; McCrae & Lockenhoff, 2010).  
In relation to regulatory fit, Wallace and Chen (2006) found that a 
promotion focus enabled productivity when operationalized as working quickly, 
but was negatively related to safety performance, operationalized as compliance 
with safety-related rules and regulations. A prevention focus resulted in higher 
safety performance but lowered productivity. Similarly, a study by Crowe and 
Higgins (1997) found that prevention-focused participants outperformed 
promotion-focused participants on a task requiring accuracy, whereas promotion-
focused participants outperformed prevention-focused participants on a task 
requiring creative solutions. 
Regulatory focus theory in negotiation 
 RFT has been applied to negotiation research within the last decade, 
consistent with the broader trend to incorporate theories of self-regulation in the 
organizational psychology literature.  Regulatory focus research in negotiation has 
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examined its effects on several negotiation variables, including self-set goals (e.g., 
reservation, aspiration, or target value), opening first offers, size and frequency of 
concessions, and economic outcomes (e.g., value claimed by individual 
negotiators, value created at the dyad level). Galinsky, Leonardelli, Okhuysen, 
and Mussweiler (2005) examined the role of regulatory focus within the context 
of goal striving in negotiations.  In Study 1, the authors found that recruiters with 
a chronic promotion focus achieved better outcomes for themselves (i.e., the 
agreed-upon salary for the candidate was lower) in a two-party, distributive salary 
negotiation compared to chronically prevention focused individuals (r = -.40, p 
< .05). Promotion focus led to a stronger focus on target values (r=.44, p < .05) in 
the negotiation compared to prevention focus; however, this was only examined 
for individuals in the recruiter role. In Study 2, negotiators with a promotion focus 
made more extreme, self-serving opening offers compared to prevention focused 
negotiators; this effect was also examined only for those in a buyer role. In the 
last study, Galinsky and colleagues (2005) demonstrated that dyads with a 
collective promotion focus were more likely to achieve Pareto efficient outcomes 
compared to dyads with a collective prevention focus in an integrative bargaining 
scenario.  
 Regulatory fit has also been examined within the context of negotiations 
to explain the tendency for negotiators in certain roles, namely buyer or seller, to 
utilize different strategies. Appelt, Zou, Arora, and Higgins (2009) found an effect 
for role as a buyer or seller on strategies employed during negotiation and 
perceptions of fit with the buyer or seller role. They suggested that buyers tended 
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to experience fit when they adopted a prevention focus due to the desire to ensure 
non-loss against loss (i.e., pay as little as possible) whereas sellers experience fit 
when they adopt a promotion focus due to the desire to ensure gains against non-
gains (i.e., receive the highest price). Appelt and Higgins (2010) measured 
participants’ regulatory focus (i.e., promotion or prevention), and manipulated 
their strategy (i.e., eagerness or vigilance) and role (i.e. buyer or seller) in a 
distributive price negotiation to examine the influence of fit on negotiated 
outcomes. Specifically, they measured the influence of focus-strategy fit and role-
strategy fit, finding that buyers and prevention-focused individuals felt greater fit 
when utilizing vigilance strategies, while sellers and promotion-focused 
individuals felt greater fit when utilizing eagerness strategies. Negotiators 
experiencing fit planned to make more demanding offers.  Additionally, men were 
more likely to adopt gain frames (i.e., view the negotiation as an opportunity to 
create value, minimize loss, attain resources, and maintain resources), 
experienced greater subjective feelings of fit, and planned to make higher 
demands compared to women (Appelt & Higgins, 2010). 
 The prevention-focused buyer and promotion-focused seller finding stands 
in line with previous research that has found buyers focus on the money they must 
pay as a loss versus sellers, who focus on the money to be received as a gain 
(Carmon & Ariely, 2000; Monga & Zhu, 2005; Neale et al., 1987). Subsequently, 
buyers and sellers frame negotiations differently. Similarly, recruiters or 
employers are potentially prevention-focused while candidates are promotion-
focused within the context of salary negotiations (Galinsky et al., 2005).  As such, 
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the negotiator role dictates the strategy choices; namely, buyers will adopt a 
vigilance strategy that ensures non-losses (i.e., spending only as much money as 
is necessary) while sellers will adopt an eagerness strategy that ensures gains (i.e., 
receiving as much money as possible) (Higgins, 2000).  Therefore, buyers’ goal 
of minimizing losses is optimized by a vigilant strategy, while sellers’ goal of 
maximizing gains is optimized by an eagerness strategy.   
Building on this research, Shalvi and colleagues (2013) found an 
interesting effect such that buyers who are chronically prevention focused are 
more averse to engaging in negotiation compared to promotion focused buyers; 
prevention focused buyers were significantly more likely than promotion focused 
buyers to exit a negotiation when confronted with a simulated counterpart that 
engaged in a tough negotiation strategy (i.e., was less willing to concede and 
made demanding offers) compared to a soft strategy. However, when prevention 
focused buyers were informed of the potential for integrative agreements, they 
were more likely to reach mutually beneficial negotiated agreements compared to 
promotion focused buyers.  Additionally, Trötschel and colleagues (2013) used a 
distributive price negotiation established from prior research (c.f., Galinsky et al., 
2005) and found that prevention focused parties who set high goals were more 
resistant to concession-making compared to their promotion focused counterparts, 
regardless of whether the counterpart held high or low goals.  
More nuanced than broad meta-analytic evidence about regulatory focus 
on performance (c.f., Lanaj, Chang, & Johnson, 2012), negotiation research might 
suggest that chronically prevention focused individuals are at an advantage as a 
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seller in distributive buyer-seller negotiations. However, Ten Velden, Beersma, 
and de Dreu (2009) offer a slightly different take on regulatory focus theory by 
contextualizing promotion and prevention focus to negotiation in their 
operationalization of negotiator motivation. Specifically, they defined appetitive 
competitors, who are motivated to win from their counterpart, a relative gain, 
versus aversive competitors, who are motivated to avoid losing from their 
counterpart (a relative non-loss).  These concepts are distinct from promotion 
focus and prevention focus because appetitive and aversive competition specify 
desired end states (i.e., winning or not losing to the counterpart) whereas 
regulatory foci do not, although they are generally characterized by a concern for 
accomplishment and obtaining a positive event (i.e., promotion focus) or safety 
and avoiding a negative event (i.e., prevention focus).  Ten Velden et al. (2009) 
found a main effect such that aversive competitors made lower initial demands 
compared to appetitive competitors in a buyer-seller negotiation, and this effect 
was mediated by feelings of anxiety. Based on earlier research (c.f., Ten Velden, 
Beersma, & de Dreu, 2008), aversive competitors are more likely to settle than 
appetitive competitors and are more likely to feel satisfied by an even split in a 
negotiation compared to appetitive competitors.  
Collectively, this research suggests that negotiators’ chronic regulatory 
focus can influence negotiated outcomes such that promotion focused individuals 
achieve better negotiated outcomes, likely through more demanding initial offers 
and lower resistance to negotiating (Galinsky et al., 2005, Shalvi et al., 2013).  
The role of a negotiator as buyer or seller (or as employer/recruiter or candidate) 
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should be in line with the strategies employed (i.e., prevention focused buyers and 
promotion focused sellers) to enhance perceptions of fit, which serve to increase 
the magnitude of goal pursuit (Appelt et al., 2009; Appelt & Higgins, 2010).  
Lastly, negotiators who are chronically prevention focused could overcome a 
potential disadvantage in distributive buyer-seller negotiations by enhancing their 
perception of integrative potential and setting high goals (Trötschel et al., 2013; 
Ten Velden Beersma, & de Dreu, 2009). Taken together, these effects are 
expected to be replicated in the current paradigm such that negotiators primed 
with an eagerness strategy will attain greater economic outcomes in the form of 
the final negotiated salary, make higher first offers, and report feeling more 
satisfied with the negotiation. Perceptions of fit will mediate the relationship 
between primed regulatory strategy and these outcomes.  
 One arena that RFT has not yet been applied is within the gender 
differences in negotiation literature.  Recent research has suggested gender 
differences in the tendency to adopt gain or non-loss frames, and experiences of 
regulatory fit (c.f., Appelt & Higgins, 2010). Given evidence that there are gender 
differences in negotiation outcomes, especially in salary negotiations (i.e., largely 
a distributive negotiation context), interventions informed by RFT seem 
promising. 
Gender differences in negotiation research  
 Gender differences in negotiation have been examined for many decades. 
Stuhlmacher and Walters (1999) conducted the first meta-analysis of gender 
effects in negotiation outcomes, showing a small but significant effect for a 
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negotiation advantage favoring men.  An update and expansion of that meta-
analysis by Mazei et al. (2015) found even larger and more variable effect sizes 
(ranging from Hedges g of -2.07 to g of 2.14) than the 1999 study.  Situations that 
were predicted to advantage men were compared to situations that were predicted 
to advantage women.  When women negotiators were in situations that were 
favorable to the female gender role (i.e., clear bargaining range, previous 
negotiation experience, negotiating on behalf of another person), their outcomes 
equaled or exceeded those of male negotiators.  Additional research has found 
that gender differences are eliminated if negotiations are framed as a learning 
situation rather than diagnostic of ability (Kray, Thompson, & Galinsky, 2001) or 
potential negotiations are re-framed as opportunities to “ask” rather than negotiate 
(Small, Gelfand, Babcock, & Gettman, 2007).  However, in situations that are 
masculine-stereotyped (e.g., salary negotiations) or otherwise induce feelings of a 
lack of fit with the negotiator role, women are still disadvantaged compared to 
men (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010; Bear & Babcock, 2012; Bowles & Babcock, 
2013; Bowles, Babcock, & Lai, 2007).   
Amanatullah and Morris (2010) found that women’s lower outcomes in a 
negotiation for entry-level salary compared to men was explained by their fear of 
being judged as too demanding or aggressive, and thus violating prescriptive 
gender stereotypes requiring women to be warm and agreeable (Eagly & Karau, 
2002).  Women are often justified in expecting these reactions to their behavior in 
negotiations, as they are often penalized for engaging in assertive negotiation 
tactics (Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013; Bowles et al., 2007; Small et al., 2005). As 
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a result, women likely experience the self-fulfilling prophecy of negotiating worse 
outcomes. The existence of beliefs that women are worse negotiators compared to 
men results in negotiation counterparts treating women differently, and women 
end up behaving in a manner that confirms these beliefs due to the fear of 
backlash for violating gender stereotypes (Kennedy & Kray, 2015). For example, 
Bowles, Babcock, and Lai (2007) conducted a series of compensation negotiation 
studies which revealed that female negotiators employing traditional negotiation 
tactics received penalties in the context of short term outcomes where 
counterparts were less likely to grant their salary requests and long-term outcomes 
where counterparts reported less willingness to work with them in the future 
compared male negotiators. 
Gender stereotypes associate men with agentic qualities such as 
competence, ambition, assertiveness, and competitiveness while women are 
associated with communal qualities such as warmth, caring, emotive, and 
supportive (Eagly & Kite, 1987). These stereotypes, according to social role 
theory, arise from women’s traditional role as homemakers and men’s traditional 
role as breadwinners, which still holds true today even as women comprise 47% 
of the U.S. labor market (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2015).  Many 
negotiation contexts subsequently associate agentic qualities with success, and 
characterize negotiations as masculine in nature (Bowles & Kray, 2013). Women 
may attempt to engage in stereotypically masculine behaviors (e.g., assertive or 
demanding offers) during a negotiation, but this often results in sanctions from the 
counterpart in the form of negative perceptions of the assertive woman negotiator. 
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Bowles and colleagues (2007) had participants read a transcript of a conversation 
between an employer and a man or woman job candidate about a job offer.  The 
job candidate either did not negotiate, used moderate language to negotiate (i.e., 
“I would like to get paid at the top of that range”) or used strong language to 
negotiate (i.e., “I think I should be paid at the top of that range. This is really 
important to me; I think I deserve it.”). The male candidate was evaluated 
similarly by participants across all conditions. For the female candidate who 
negotiated using moderate or strong language, participants reported feeling 
significantly less interested in working with her, and perceived her as being more 
demanding and less likable. This study illustrates the Catch-22 for women 
negotiators, who often feel they must choose between economic gains or positive 
social perceptions.  Additionally, women are more likely than men to be targets of 
deception in negotiation, thus leading them to make deals under false pretenses 
that result in worse outcomes (Kray, Kennedy, & Van Zant, 2014). Another recent 
study found that men insisted on receiving higher salaries from a woman hiring 
manager compared to a man hiring manager as a result of men experiencing 
higher implicit threat (Netchaeva, Kouchaki, & Sheppard, 2015). Lastly, a study 
by Kray and Haselhuhn (2012) found that men experiencing threat to their 
masculinity were more likely to use unethical bargaining tactics; this effect was 
not present for women.  
In line with these findings, women are more likely to report a greater 
dislike of negotiating (Kray & Babcock, 2006), report lower negotiation self-
efficacy (Stevens, Bavetta, & Gist, 1993), and are more likely to anticipate what 
25 
 
is known as backlash, or negative evaluations of their likability, if they engage in 
agentic behaviors that would improve perceptions of their negotiation competence 
(Heilman, Wallen, Fuchs, & Tamkins, 2004). A recent study by Williams and 
Tiedans (2015) reinforced the backlash concept, finding that women’s likability 
(d = -.28) and hireability (d = -.58) is harmed by overt displays of dominance 
(e.g., in the form of direct demands), both of which have direct implications for 
negotiation. In addition to these effects of backlash, Rudman, Moss-Racusin, 
Glick, and Phelan (2012) describe how women’s fear of backlash can inhibit self-
regulatory processes in their backlash avoidance model, which incorporates RFT.   
Integrating RFT into gender and negotiation research 
According to the backlash avoidance model (i.e., BAM), when women 
fear backlash for violating gender stereotypes, they are more likely to enter a 
cautious, evaluative, and preventative self-regulatory mode to avoid backlash that 
subsequently detracts from the ability to engage in unconstrained goal pursuit 
(Rudman et al., 2012; Rudman & Phelan, 2008). Thus, fear of backlash primes a 
prevention focus, and women’s ability to engage in effective self-promotion (i.e., 
“pointing with pride to one’s accomplishments, speaking directly about one’s 
strengths and talents, and making internal rather than external attributions for 
achievements”) behaviors declines, even in situations that require it (i.e., 
negotiation) for success (Rudman, 1998, p. 629).  In a structural equation model 
of their theory, Rudman and colleagues (2012) found that fear of backlash 
negatively predicted acute promotion focus and positively predicted acute 
prevention focus. Following this, regulatory focus predicted success in self-
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promotion; the direct path from fear of backlash to self-promotion was significant, 
thus indicating partial mediation by regulatory focus.  Indeed, women’s fear of 
backlash mediated gender differences in a salary negotiation study by 
Amanatullah and Morris (2010).  According to BAM, fear of backlash for 
successful performance can hurt women negotiators’ outcomes rather than actual 
differences in women’s and men’s negotiation abilities.  
 Based on the recent additions to the negotiation literature concerning RFT 
and gender differences in framing and perceptions of fit in distributive buyer-
seller negotiations (Appelt & Higgins, 2010) and the extant research on gender 
differences in negotiation, an integration of BAM and RFT could inform an 
intervention designed to improve women’s negotiation success in arenas where 
they are still traditionally disadvantaged.  Specifically, an intervention could be 
designed to minimize women’s fear of backlash in a context where gender 
differences exist: salary negotiations.  By incorporating research on regulatory fit, 
the BAM may be adapted such that women negotiators who experience fit 
between their role in a salary negotiation as a candidate (i.e., promotion focus) 
and goal pursuit strategy (i.e., eagerness) may report less fear of backlash 
compared to women who experience a misfit between their role as a job candidate 
and goal pursuit strategy (i.e., vigilance) or women in a control group; this runs 
contrary to the BAM’s model where fear of backlash instigates an acute 
promotion or prevention focus. Due to the research on fit and promotion focus 
generally, women may overcome fear of backlash in a salary negotiation and 
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engage in more assertive negotiation tactics when they experience role-strategy fit 
in anticipation of the actual negotiation.  
Role-strategy fit may serve as a mechanism through which women can 
feel justified in adopting goal pursuit strategies in negotiation.  Therefore, women 
who experience role-strategy fit as a result of being primed to enact eagerness 
strategies are predicted to be more objectively (i.e., economically) and 
subjectively (i.e., feeling satisfied, reduced fear of backlash) successful compared 
to women in a control group. “Eager” negotiators are those who focus on attaining 
their aspiration values in a negotiation. Priming an eager negotiator in a salary 
negotiation would look like an overt focus on reaching one’s aspiration salary. 
Therefore, women primed to be eager job candidates in a salary negotiation may 
achieve better economic outcomes compared to women in a control group.  
Similarly, women who are primed to be eager job candidates may make 
higher first offers compared to women in a control group. Other research has 
demonstrated that negotiators who make higher first offers in distributive settings 
(i.e., salary negotiations) often claim more value compared to negotiators who 
make lower first offers (Buelens & Van Poucke, 2004). One explanation for this 
“first offer effect” is that a counterpart becomes cognitively anchored to the salary 
negotiations. If women employ an eagerness strategy where they focus on setting 
and attaining a higher aspiration value, this may have downstream effects by 
minimizing the perception of risk for negotiating for a competitive salary. Women 
with an eagerness strategy may be more likely to initiate first offers, increase the 
value of first offers, resist counteroffers, and attain a higher negotiated salary 
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compared to using no particular strategy.  Overall, negotiators with an eagerness 
strategy are predicted to make higher first offers compared to those in a control 
group as they are likely cognitively “anchored” to their aspiration salary rather 
than an arbitrary salary value (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001).  
In addition to the influence on economic outcomes of the negotiation, it is 
also expected that women using an eagerness strategy will report lower 
expectations of backlash compared to women in a control group. Theoretically, 
priming women to enact eagerness strategies may induce a general promotion 
focus. Previous research has established a relationship between a promotion focus 
and positive temperaments and emotional states, and prevention focus and neutral 
or slightly more negative emotional states (e.g., anxiousness) (c.f., Higgins et al., 
2001). Focusing on implementing an eagerness strategy could manifest as positive 
feelings about an upcoming salary negotiation, thus reducing fear of backlash and 
anxiety related to negotiating. As a result, women using an eagerness strategy 
may report lower expectations for social backlash compared to women in a 
control group. In addition, it is expected that anticipated backlash could mediate 
the relationship between gender and negotiated outcomes, thus replicating 
predictions from the BAM. 
Lastly, women who use an eagerness strategy are expected to report 
greater feelings of satisfaction with the negotiation and final negotiated salary. 
Similar to the logic described regarding anticipated backlash, the eagerness 
strategy prime may enhance positive feelings in addition to serving as a means 
through which desired goals are more likely to be attained in the negotiation. As 
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seen in previous research, individuals who attain their goals in negotiation report 
feeling more satisfied (Curhan et al., 2006). If negotiators who use an eagerness 
strategy attain higher negotiated salaries on average compared to negotiators who 
do not use any particular strategy, it is likely they also report greater feelings of 
satisfaction. As a result, it is expected that women who use an eagerness strategy 
will report greater subjective feelings of satisfaction with the negotiation 
compared to women who don’t use any particular strategy. 
To elicit the strongest effects of these predictions, the current research will 
utilize trained male confederates to play the role of a hiring manager in a salary 
negotiation. This approach is similar to previous research that used experimental 
manipulations aimed at reducing gender differences in negotiation (Stevens et al., 
1993; Tellhed & Björklund, 2011). Since the gender of one’s negotiation 
counterpart influences behavior, controlling for this effect as much as possible 
will present a clearer picture of the influence of an eagerness strategy on gender 
differences in a salary negotiation. 
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Hypotheses  
 Regulatory focus was predicted to relate to negotiation strategies, 
perceptions, and outcomes, and produce distinct gender differences when 
manipulated. The following hypotheses describe these predictions in greater 
detail.  
Hypothesis 1A. The eagerness strategy will lead to negotiating significantly 
higher final salaries compared to no specific strategy.  
Hypothesis 1B. The eagerness strategy will lead to significantly higher first offers 
compared to no specific strategy. 
Hypothesis 1C. The eagerness strategy will lead to significantly higher average 
feelings of negotiation satisfaction compared to no specific strategy. 
Hypothesis 2. Women will report significantly higher chronic prevention focus 
compared to men. 
Hypothesis 3A. There will be an interaction between gender and strategy on 
negotiated outcome such that women who use an eagerness strategy will negotiate 
significantly higher final salaries compared to women who use no specific 
strategy. 
Hypothesis 3B. There will be an interaction between gender and strategy on first 
offers such that women who use an eagerness strategy will negotiate significantly 
higher first offers compared to women who use no specific strategy. 
Hypothesis 3C. There will be an interaction between gender and strategy on 
subjective outcomes such that women who use an eagerness strategy will report 
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significantly higher negotiation satisfaction compared to women who use no 
specific strategy. 
Hypothesis 4A. Women will report significantly higher anticipated negotiation 
backlash compared to men.  
Hypothesis 4B. Women who use an eagerness strategy will report significantly 
lower anticipated negotiation backlash compared to women who use no specific 
strategy. 
Hypothesis 5.  Anticipated negotiation backlash will mediate the relationship 
between gender and final negotiated salary. 
Method 
 This research utilized a 2 (eagerness strategy, free choice strategy) X 2 
(male, female) between-subjects factorial design to examine male and female 
participants in a salary negotiation regarding their expectations of backlash, their 
negotiated outcomes (i.e., first offer and final negotiated salary), and negotiation 
satisfaction (i.e., terms of the negotiation, overall feelings of satisfaction and 
competence following the negotiation, feelings about the negotiation process, and 
feelings about the negotiation counterpart).  
The following sections describe the proposed participant sample, scales 
and measures for use including the negotiation simulation and intervention 
materials, and the procedures of the research protocol. 
Research Participants 
The current research required a sample size of 130 participants total per 
the power analysis tool G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). In 
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G*Power, the following a priori assumptions were used to determine sample size 
given: confidence level (i.e., 95%), power (i.e., .90), predicted effect size (i.e., 
d=.20), and proposed analyses which include ANCOVAs of at most a 2 X 2 
design, and mediation. The confidence interval was set at 95% in line with 
standards for null hypothesis significance testing (Coolican, 2014). The predicted 
effect size was estimated using a combination of Cohen’s (1992) standards for 
small effect sizes (i.e., d=.10) and the existing research which has reported similar 
analyses where the effect size of gender on economic negotiation outcomes (i.e., 
in distributive settings such as salary negotiations) is typically between d=.1 and 
d=.3 (Mazei et al., 2015). The relationship between regulatory focus and 
economic negotiation outcomes has previously been estimated at d=.3 (Lanaj, 
Chang, & Johnson, 2013).  
Participants were drawn from two sources. The first source of participants 
was through DePaul’s research participant pool and the second source was from 
campus recruiting of non-research pool participants.  
Procedure 
 Participants were recruited through the research participant pool or 
campus recruitment efforts were directed to a lab on the Lincoln Park Campus. 
Participants were asked to read and sign an informed consent document which 
outlined the requirements for their participation (i.e., 18 years of age or older, 
ability to speak, read, and write English fluently) and notified that they could end 
their participation at any time (Appendix A). Research participant pool 
participants were given 1.5 credits for their participation and non-research pool 
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participants received a $10 Amazon gift card at the conclusion of the experiment. 
There were two separate consent forms. 
To elicit the strongest control for the hypotheses, the research utilized 
trained male confederates to play the role of a hiring manager in a salary 
negotiation. This approach is similar to previous research that has used trained 
confederates in a paradigm which tests an intervention aimed at reducing gender 
differences in negotiation (Stevens et al., 1993; Tellhed & Björklund, 2011). 
Because the gender of one’s negotiation counterpart can influence behavior (c.f., 
Amanatullah & Morris, 2010), controlling for this effect will present a clearer 
picture of the influence of the regulatory focus manipulation on gender 
differences in a salary negotiation.  
Participants were informed that they would negotiate with another 
participant and were not informed that a confederate played the role of the hiring 
manager until the conclusion of the study. Three confederates (i.e., two male 
undergraduate students and one male graduate student) were trained on the 
experimental protocol as well as a script that was loosely derived from similar 
negotiation research that used confederates. The confederates were trained on a 
script that detailed the offers and counteroffers they were to employ throughout 
the negotiation depending on the participant’s (i.e., job candidate’s) behavior, 
including a payoff table (see Appendix B). Confederates were given explicit 
instructions about the amount of the first offer and the amount to concede 
following counteroffers made by the participant. Confederates were to concede 
different amounts to the participants depending on the legitimacy of the 
34 
 
participant’s justifications. Legitimate justifications were directly related to the 
negotiation instructions that participants were provided (e.g., cost of living, offer 
from another company) or were otherwise directly job-related (e.g., previous 
experience related to the job such as an internship, research on the competitive 
salaries offered by others in the field). Justifications that were not considered 
legitimate were not directly job-related (e.g., paying off debt).  
Confederates were instructed to respond using pre-determined phrases 
(e.g., “I can’t accept that salary. Offers are made based on the market value and 
what competitors are offering”) if the participant reiterated a previously used 
justification, justified their offer or counteroffer using a mix of legitimate and 
illegitimate justifications, or used an irrelevant justification (i.e., non-job related). 
Additionally, the confederate was informed to resist the participant on at least two 
other occasions if the participant continued producing legitimate justifications 
with subsequent counteroffers beyond the first few exchanges.  
Confederates received at least two hours of training prior to interacting 
with participants. All confederates were instructed to alert the experimenter in the 
event they knew a participant. 
After signing the informed consent form, an experimenter instructed the 
participants to complete the pre-negotiation questionnaire.  Participants responded 
to two scales, which measured their chronic regulatory focus and negotiation self-
efficacy.  
Pre-negotiation questionnaire. The pre-negotiation materials included 
the following (in order): The Regulatory Focus Questionnaire (see Appendix C) 
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and the Negotiation Self-Efficacy (i.e., DSE and ISE) scales (see Appendix D). 
Next, participants were instructed to read information about the upcoming 
negotiation, which included the experimental manipulation of regulatory focus.  
Negotiation instructions and manipulation. Participants were assigned 
to the role of a job candidate and received written information which described 
that they were entering a final salary negotiation for a new job. This paradigm 
was adapted from “The Bonus” (c.f., Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001). The 
negotiation instructions described the job candidate’s background and interests to 
serve as reasonable justifications during the negotiation (e.g., previous job 
experience), as well as an alternative to reaching a negotiated agreement (i.e., 
another job offer with a salary of $55,000) as well as a salary that served as a high 
target ($70,000). All participants received the same background information about 
the negotiation. 
Regulatory focus, the major study variable, was manipulated such that 
male and female participants were randomly assigned to either the manipulation 
condition (i.e., instructed to adopt an eagerness strategy for the salary negotiation) 
or a control condition (i.e., instructed to adopt any strategy for the salary 
negotiation) (see Appendix E). The eagerness strategy includes a focus on one’s 
aspiration value (i.e., the maximum salary one wishes to attain from the salary 
negotiation) and framing the salary negotiation as an opportunity to maximize 
one’s own outcomes. Conversely, the participants in the control condition could 
adopt any strategy, which includes an emphasis on the importance of setting a 
strategy (i.e., specific offers or behaviors that could be effective depending on the 
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expected behavior of one’s counterpart) in salary negotiations. Participants were 
given ten minutes to prepare and write down their negotiation strategy.  
Prior to negotiating, participants completed four items which measure the 
extent to which they viewed the upcoming negotiation as an opportunity to avoid 
losses or achieve gains, and anticipated backlash items, which asks the participant 
to identify the offer (e.g., $65,000) which would induce negative reactions from 
the hiring manager (see Appendix F). 
Next, the confederate (i.e., hiring manager) was moved to the same room 
as the participant (i.e., job candidate). The experimenter then instructed the 
participant and the confederate to begin the negotiation. Participants had up to 
fifteen minutes to negotiate with the confederate acting as the hiring manager. 
First offers were recorded by research assistants. If the confederate (i.e., hiring 
manager) made the first offer, this was noted and the participant’s (i.e., job 
candidate’s) counteroffer (i.e., first offer in the negotiation) was recorded. 
Post-negotiation questionnaire. The post-negotiation questionnaire 
included the final agreed-upon salary value, the Subjective Value Inventory 
(Appendix G), experienced backlash items (Appendix H), and demographic items 
(Appendix I).  Given that the experiment required deception, participants were 
fully debriefed and asked to sign a form to receive credit (Research Participant 
Pool) or receive a $10 gift card (non-Research Participant Pool) (Appendix J).  
Measures  
Regulatory focus. The Regulatory Focus Questionnaire (i.e., RFQ) was 
developed to measure an individual’s chronic regulatory focus (Higgins et al., 
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2001).  The RFQ taps into the prior success that an individual has had in terms of 
prevention or promotion; people who have successfully used eagerness strategies 
(i.e., indicative of promotion focus) in the past will likely use eagerness strategies 
in new situations while people who have successfully used vigilance strategies 
(i.e., indicative of prevention focus) in the past will likely use vigilance strategies 
in new situations. The RFQ has 11 items on a 5-point Likert-type scale. 
Individuals who have had previous success with eagerness strategies will have a 
higher promotion score and individuals with previous success with vigilance 
strategies will have a higher prevention score. An individual can score high on 
both, on one, or on neither scale. Previous research (Grant & Higgins, 2003; 
Higgins et al., 2001) has reported Cronbach’s alphas of .73 for promotion focus 
items and .80 for prevention focus items and test-retest reliability of .79 and .81, 
respectively. Both sub-scales were also significantly related to achievement 
motivation (Grant & Higgins, 2003; Higgins et al., 2001). 
 Negotiation self-efficacy. The Distributive and Integrative Self-Efficacy 
(i.e., DSE and ISE) scales measure a negotiator’s confidence in their ability to 
utilize strategies that are specific to distributive or integrative negotiations 
(Sullivan, O’Connor, & Burris, 2006). Task specific (rather than general) 
measures of self-efficacy are more predictive of behavior because they target the 
beliefs associated with engaging in particular behaviors for a given activity 
(Bandura, 1997). The DSE and ISE each evaluate four tactics that are enacted in 
either distributive or integrative negotiations (e.g., gaining the upper hand or 
exchanging concessions), and ask participants to rate their confidence in using 
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each tactic successfully in a negotiation on a 100-point scale where 0=no 
confidence and 100=full confidence across each of the tactics. Previous research 
reported internal consistency (i.e., Cronbach’s alpha) between .80 and .90 across 
the two scales, divergent validity (i.e., low correlation coefficients) with a general 
measure of self-efficacy, and evidence of predictive validity such that the DSE 
significantly predicted the use of distributive tactics in negotiation and the ISE 
significantly predicted the use of integrative tactics in negotiation (Sullivan et al., 
2006). 
 Manipulation check. Four manipulation check items followed the 
administration of the negotiation information. Using a 7 point Likert-type scale 
ranging from 1= “Strongly Disagree” to 7= “Strongly Agree”, participants rated 
the extent to which they viewed the negotiation as a chance to create value, 
minimize losses, attain resources, and maintain resources. The “create value” and 
“attain resources” items were expected to be rated higher for participants primed 
for an eagerness strategy compared to participants in the control condition. These 
items were used in previous research (c.f., Appelt & Higgins, 2010) where the 
“minimize losses” and “maintain resources” items were reverse-scored and 
combined with the other two items to create an average “gain framing” score; 
however, their study reported a Cronbach’s alpha of .66. For the current research, 
the two eagerness items and two vigilance items were combined separately from 
one another.  
Anticipated backlash. Participants completed two items measuring 
anticipated backlash: “How much do you think you can reasonably ask for 
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without the hiring manager’s perceiving you to be a pushy person?” and “How 
much do you think you can reasonably ask for without causing the hiring manager 
to punish you for being too demanding?” (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010). 
Participants responded with the dollar value threshold at which they expect to 
incur negative social consequences; thus, a lower score indicates greater 
anticipation of backlash. Previous research has found these items to be highly 
correlated, thus participants’ responses will be averaged to form an overall score 
for anticipated backlash (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010). 
Negotiation subjective value.  The Subjective Value Inventory (i.e., SVI) 
includes 16 items measuring four distinct but related sub-scales on perceptions in 
negotiation (Curhan et al., 2006). Items are evaluated on 7-point Likert-type 
scales. These include four instrumental outcomes items (i.e., feelings about the 
terms of the deal such as whether the economic outcome was desirable, balanced, 
and consistent), four “self” items (i.e., feelings about the self, such as the extent to 
which participants feel they lost face or felt competent in the negotiation, and feel 
satisfied they behaved appropriately), four process items (i.e., feelings about the 
negotiation process such as whether participants feel they have been heard and 
treated fairly), and four relationship items (i.e., feelings about the relationship 
participants had with their negotiation counterpart, positive impressions of the 
counterpart, and whether they had a solid relationship to work together in the 
future).  In line with previous research using the SVI, participants’ scores across 
the items will be averaged to create a global score of satisfaction with the 
negotiation. The four-factor structure of the SVI was established in Curhan et al. 
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(2006) and found that the SVI significantly predicts negotiators’ desire to work 
together in the future. 
Experienced backlash. The Experienced Backlash scale includes 6 items 
related to the participant’s willingness to work with their negotiation counterpart 
at work or socially (Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013). Items are evaluated on a 7-
point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 = “Not at all” to 7 = “Extremely”. A higher 
average score across the items indicates greater social acceptance of the 
counterpart and therefore less backlash compared to lower average scores. 
Amanatullah and Tinsey (2013) reported a Cronbach’s alpha of .93 using the 
scale within an undergraduate student sample. Previous research has shown that 
experienced backlash moderates the relationship between gender and negotiated 
outcomes such that women tend to experience greater backlash compared to men 
for negotiating assertively. As a result, experienced backlash is negatively 
correlated with women’s economic or financial outcomes in negotiation compared 
to men’s. 
Demographics. Lastly, participants responded to the following 
demographic items: gender (0=male, 1=female), race/ethnicity (1=White, 
2=African American/Black, 3=Hispanic, 4=Asian, 5=Hawaiian or other Pacific 
Islander, 6=American Indian, 7=Two or More Races), age (reported numerically), 
and previous negotiation experience (1=“No previous experience”, 2=“Little 
experience”, 3=“Some experience”, 4=“Quite a bit of experience”, or 
5=“Extensive experience”). 
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Results 
 The hypotheses for this study were evaluated using 2X2 factorial 
ANCOVAs, one-way ANOVAs, and mediation analyses using Preacher and 
Hayes’ (2004) methodology. Gender (male, female) and experimental condition 
(i.e., eagerness strategy, control condition) were the independent variables. 
Economic outcome (i.e., salary), first offers, anticipated backlash, and subjective 
outcomes (job candidate’s global scores on the SVI) were dependent variables. 
Anticipated backlash was also examined as a mediator between gender and final 
negotiated salary. 
 The total sample size analyzed consisted of 130 participants. As a first 
step, the data was checked to examine outliers, missing data, descriptive statistics, 
and reliability statistics for all study variables. Three cases were excluded due to 
participants either knowing the confederate or not completing all study measures. 
There were sixty-five men and sixty-five women who participated: 63.8% White 
(n=83), 8.5% Black (n=11), 11.5% Hispanic (n=15), 10% Asian (n=13), 0.8% 
Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander (n=1), and 5.4% two or more races (n=7), with 
a mean age of 20.19 (SD=2.73). Final negotiated salary ranged from $55,000 to 
$70,000, first offers ranged from $55,000 to $85,000, and anticipated backlash 
ranged from $45,000 to $92,500. A summary of descriptive statistics and 
correlations for all major study variables is presented in Table 1. Correlations did 
not significantly differ based on which of the three confederate hiring managers 
negotiated or based on participant type (research pool versus $10 gift card). 
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 Reliability analyses on sub-scales of the Regulatory Focus Questionnaire 
(i.e., promotion focus and prevention focus), the Negotiation Self-Efficacy items, 
the anticipated backlash items, the experienced backlash items, and the Subjective 
Value Inventory (SVI) showed Cronbach’s alpha exceeded .80 for each scale; 
therefore, all scales were included in relevant hypothesis testing.  
 Previous negotiation experience was significantly correlated with final 
negotiated salary (r= .19, p < .05) and negotiation satisfaction (r= .26, p < .01), 
and was therefore entered as a covariate for the appropriate analyses. Previous 
negotiation experience was also significantly correlated with age (r=.35, p < .01). 
Although no formal hypotheses were tested regarding negotiation self-
efficacy, it was significantly correlated with gender (r= -.36, p < .01), age (r=.26, 
p < .01), previous negotiation experience (r=.34, p < .01), and anticipated 
backlash (r=.35, p < .01). 
 The manipulation check items revealed that participants in the eagerness 
strategy condition did not statistically significantly differ in mean responses to the 
two items indicating a “gain frame” compared to the participants in the control 
condition F(128)=.03, p=.85 (M=5.63 (SD=1.19)  and M=5.66 (SD=.73), 
respectively), suggesting that development of an eagerness strategy does not 
produce a stronger gain focus in and of itself. 
Data was found to meet assumptions for ANCOVA, ANOVA, and 
mediation analysis. Specifically, data met assumptions of normality, 
independence, and homogeneity of variance. The residuals of each dependent 
variable given each condition of the independent variables was examined using 
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normal and detrended normal q-q plots, histograms, and box plots. Although the 
final negotiated salary variable was bi-modally distributed, the data appeared 
normal within each level of the independent variables (e.g., male, female, no 
strategy assigned, eagerness strategy).
44 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Means, standard deviations, and correlations of major study variables 
Variable Name M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. Gender - - -                    
2. Condition  - -0.05 -            
3. Age      20.19      2.73 -0.04 0.00   -           
4. Ethnicity - - 0.04 0.05 0.15 -          
5. Experience         2.11      1.07 -0.14  -0.02   0.35**  0.31** -         
6. Negotiation Self-
Efficacy 
      57.47     19.32   -0.36**  -0.12  0.26**  -0.08   0.34** (.93)        
7. Prevention Focus         3.16      0.74 0.10 0.06  -0.09 0.03  -0.07 -0.04   (.85)       
8. Gain Frame         5.65      0.99 -0.12  -0.02   0.03  -0.19*  0.27* 0.41** -0.17 -      
9. Loss Frame         5.19      0.99  0.09  -0.01  -0.02 -0.05   0.16  0.14 -0.04 0.59** -     
10. Anticipated 
Backlash 
68573.00 7529.89   -0.26**   0.26**   0.04 -0.07   0.05  0.18* -0.09  0.07   0.05 (.89)    
11. First Offer 65723.08 5022.45 -0.12   0.35**   0.06 0.05  -0.01 -0.07 -0.05 -0.12  -0.11 0.36** -   
12. Final Negotiated 
Salary 
62003.85 3203.98   -0.28**   0.32**   0.08 0.11 0.19* -0.02 -0.09  0.01  -0.06  0.49** 0.25** -  
13. SVI Composite        4.79      0.92 0.10 0.08   0.14 0.22* 0.26**  0.02 0.08  0.15  0.21* -0.09  -0.16 0.24** (.89) 
Note: n = 130, * p < .05, 2-tailed ** p < .01, 2-tailed, Cronbach’s alpha reported on the diagonal where applicable. Gender (0=male, 1=female), Condition (0=no assigned 
strategy, 1=eagerness strategy) 
Scales: Previous negotiation experience (1-5), Negotiation Self Efficacy (1-100), Prevention Focus (1-5), Gain/Loss Frame (1-7), Anticipated Backlash (U.S. dollars), SVI (1-7) 
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  Hypothesis 1A predicted that participants with an eagerness strategy 
would negotiate significantly higher salaries compared to participants with no 
specific strategy.  The ANCOVA included experimental condition (i.e., 0= no 
assigned strategy, 1=eagerness strategy) as the independent variable, previous 
negotiation experience as a covariate, and final negotiated salary as the dependent 
variable. The analysis revealed a statistically significant main effect which 
supports the hypothesis F(1, 128)=14.79, p < .01, d=.67 (see Figure 1). 
Participants with an eagerness strategy negotiated a higher average final salary 
(M=63,000.00, SD=3,187.33) compared to participants with no specific strategy 
(M=60,944.44, SD=2,886.44). Therefore, Hypothesis 1A was supported. 
Hypothesis 1B predicted that participants with an eagerness strategy 
would make significantly higher first offers compared to participants with no 
specific strategy.  The one-way ANOVA included experimental condition (i.e., 0= 
no assigned strategy, 1=eagerness strategy) as the independent variable and first 
offer (i.e., dollar value) as the dependent variable. The analysis revealed a 
statistically significant main effect which supports the hypothesis F(1, 
128)=18.15, p < .01, d=.75 (see Figure 2). Participants with an eagerness strategy 
condition made higher average first offers (M=67,432.84, SD=4,881.00) 
compared to participants with no specific strategy (M=63,904.76, SD=4,539.13). 
Therefore, Hypothesis 1B was supported. 
Hypothesis 1C predicted that participants with an eagerness strategy 
would report significantly higher negotiation satisfaction compared to participants 
with no specific strategy.  The one-way ANOVA included experimental condition 
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(i.e., 0=no assigned strategy, 1=eagerness strategy) as the independent variable 
and SVI composite (i.e., average across all SVI items) as the dependent variable. 
The analysis did not reveal a statistically significant main effect F(1, 128)=0.72, 
p=.40, d=.15. Participants with an eagerness strategy were only slightly more 
satisfied with the negotiation (M=4.87, SD=0.98) compared to participants with 
no specific strategy (M=4.73, SD=0.84). Therefore, Hypothesis 1C was not 
supported. However, negotiation satisfaction was significantly correlated with 
final negotiated salary (r=.24, p < .01) and previous experience (r=.26, p < .01).  
Table 2 illustrates the descriptive statistics across experimental condition 
for Hypotheses 1A, 1B, and 1C below. 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics by experimental condition across dependent 
variables 
Condition  N M SD 
Final Salary Control 63 60944.44 2886.44 
Eagerness 67 63000.00 3187.33 
First Offer Control 63 63904.76 4539.13 
Eagerness 67 67432.84 4881.08 
Subjective Value Control 63 4.73 0.84 
Eagerness 67 4.87 0.98 
 
 Hypothesis 2 predicted that women would be significantly more 
prevention focused compared to men.  Prevention focus items were completed 
prior to the negotiation instructions (and experimental manipulation) were 
presented to participants. The one-way ANOVA included participant gender (i.e., 
0=male, 1=female) as the independent variable and average score across the 
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prevention focus sub-scale items as the dependent variable. The analysis did not 
reveal a statistically significant main effect F(1, 128)=1.36, p=.25, d=.20. Women 
were slightly more prevention focused (M=3.23, SD=.78) compared to men 
(M=3.08, SD=.69). Therefore, Hypothesis 2A was not supported. 
 Hypothesis 3A predicted that women with an eagerness strategy would 
negotiate significantly higher salaries compared to women with no specific 
strategy. The two-way, factorial ANCOVA included participant gender (i.e., 
0=male, 1=female) and condition (i.e., 0= no assigned strategy, 1=eagerness 
strategy) as the independent variables, previous negotiation experience as a 
covariate, and final negotiated salary as the dependent variable. The omnibus test 
was statistically significant F(4,125)=7.76, p < .01. The interaction term between 
participant gender and condition was not statistically significant F(1,125)=0.16, 
p=.69. The sequential, Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise comparison of women with 
an eagerness strategy (M=62,281.25, SD=512.72) to women with no specific 
strategy (M=60,000.00, SD=504.89) revealed that there was a statistically 
significant mean difference in final negotiated salary F(1, 124)=10.05, p < .01, 
d=.76 (see Figure 3). Therefore, Hypothesis 3A was supported.   
Hypothesis 3B predicted women with an eagerness strategy would make 
significantly higher first offers compared to women with no specific strategy. The 
two-way, factorial ANOVA included participant gender (i.e., 0=male, 1=female) 
and condition (i.e., 0= no assigned strategy, 1=eagerness strategy) as the 
independent variables and first offer dollar value as the dependent variable. The 
omnibus test was statistically significant F(3,126)=6.80, p < .01. The interaction 
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term between participant gender and condition was not statistically significant 
F(1,126)=0.55, p=.46. The sequential, Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise comparison 
of women with an eagerness strategy (M=66,562.50, SD=820.48) to women with 
no assigned strategy (M=63,696.97, SD=807.96) revealed that there was a 
statistically significant mean difference in first offers F(1, 125)=6.19, p < .01, 
d=.63 (see Figure 4). Therefore, Hypothesis 3B was supported.   
Hypothesis 3C predicted that women with an eagerness strategy would be 
significantly more satisfied with the negotiation compared to women with no 
specific strategy. The two-way, factorial ANOVA included participant gender 
(i.e., 0=male, 1=female) and condition (i.e., 0= no assigned strategy, 1=eagerness 
strategy) as the independent variables and satisfaction with the negotiation (i.e., 
mean scores on the SVI composite) as the dependent variable. The omnibus test 
was not statistically significant F(3,126)=.94, p=.42. Therefore, the interaction 
term between participant gender and condition was not statistically significant 
F(1,126)=0.69, p=.41. Women with an eagerness strategy (M=4.89, SD=.16) had 
about the same reported overall satisfaction with the negotiation as women with 
no specific strategy (M=4.89, SD=.16). Therefore, Hypothesis 3C was not 
supported.   
Table 3 illustrates the descriptive statistics by experimental condition for 
women in Hypotheses 3A, 3B, 3C and 4B. 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics for gender by experimental condition across 
dependent variables 
  Women Men 
Variable Condition N M SD N M SD 
Final 
Salary 
Control 33 60000.00 2318.40 30 61983.33 3122.45 
Eagerness 32 62281.25 3578.47 35 63657.14 2667.26 
First Offer Control 33 63696.97 4304.68 30 64133.33 4847.56 
Eagerness 32 66562.50 4838.94 35 68228.57 4851.23 
Subjective 
Value 
Control 33 4.89 0.91 30 4.56 0.74 
Approach 32 4.90 0.99 35 4.84 0.99 
Anticipated 
Backlash 
Control 33 64556.67 4512.53 30 68836.67 8641.27 
Eagerness 32 68722.50 4698.66 35 71997.00 9183.22 
 
Hypothesis 4A predicted that women would indicate greater anticipated 
backlash for negotiating (i.e., the average across the two anticipated backlash 
items would be lower for women) compared to men. Anticipated backlash was 
measured after the negotiation instructions (and experimental manipulation) were 
completed, but before participants negotiated with the hiring manager. This 
hypothesis was tested using a one-way ANOVA which included participant 
gender (i.e., 0=male, 1=female) as the independent variable and anticipated 
backlash (i.e., mean across two anticipated backlash items) as the dependent 
variable. The main effect of gender on anticipated backlash was statistically 
significant F(1,126)=9.15, p < .01, d=.54. Women anticipated greater backlash for 
negotiating (i.e., they anticipated greater backlash at a lower threshold value for 
the negotiated salary) (M=66,607.54, SD=5,027.97) compared to men 
(M=70,538.38, SD=9,008.75). Therefore, Hypothesis 4A was supported. 
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Hypothesis 4B predicted that women with an eagerness strategy would 
anticipate significantly less backlash for negotiating (i.e., the average across the 
two anticipated backlash items would be higher) compared to women with no 
specific strategy. Anticipated backlash was measured after the negotiation 
instructions (and experimental manipulation) were completed, but before 
participants negotiated with the hiring manager. This hypothesis was tested using 
a two-way, factorial ANOVA which included participant gender (i.e., 0=male, 
1=female) and condition (i.e., 0= no assigned strategy, 1=eagerness strategy) as 
the independent variables and anticipated backlash (i.e., mean across two 
anticipated backlash items) as the dependent variable. The omnibus test was 
statistically significant F(3,126)=6.24, p < .01. The interaction term between 
participant gender and condition was not statistically significant F(1,126)=.16, 
p=.69. The sequential, Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise comparison of women with 
an eagerness strategy (M=68,722.50, SD=1,237.32) to women with no specific 
strategy (M=64,556.67, SD=1,218.42) revealed that there was a statistically 
significant mean difference F(1, 125)=5.76, p < .01, d=.90. Therefore, Hypothesis 
4B was supported.   
 Hypothesis 5 predicted that the effect of gender on final negotiated salary 
would be explained (i.e., mediated) by anticipated backlash. Anticipated backlash 
was measured after the negotiation instructions (and experimental manipulation) 
were completed, but before participants negotiated with the hiring manager. 
Hypothesis 3C was tested using the Preacher and Hayes (2004) method for simple 
mediation where gender (0=male, 1=female) was entered as the independent 
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variable, anticipated backlash was the mediator, and final negotiated salary was 
the dependent variable. Anticipated backlash was found to fully mediate the 
relationship between participant gender and final negotiated salary. The indirect 
effect was -.752.95 with a bootstrapped 95% confidence interval between -
1274.93 and -305.90 (Bootstrap SE=245.09); since the confidence interval does 
not include zero, this is considered a statistically significant effect. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 5 was supported. 
Discussion 
 The current research examined the effect of an experimental manipulation 
of regulatory focus on gender differences in a salary negotiation; namely, the 
amount of a job candidate’s first offer, the final negotiated salary, overall 
satisfaction with the negotiation, and anticipated social backlash for negotiating. 
The results of this study are promising in that they generally indicate that anyone 
may be able to improve their salary negotiation outcomes if they consciously 
adopt an eagerness strategy where they focus on their aspiration value and 
mindfully frame the negotiation as an opportunity rather than an obligation. 
Women in particular can benefit from adopting an eagerness strategy to attain a 
higher starting salary and reduce feelings of anticipated backlash for negotiating 
to achieve their aspiration value in negotiations. Previous research has already 
demonstrated that sellers who employ an eagerness strategy compared to a 
vigilance strategy (i.e., a focus on avoiding losses) fare better in buyer-seller 
negotiations (Galinsky et al., 2005; Appelt & Higgins, 2010). The current 
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research replicated this effect, and extended RFT by integrating the influence of 
gender effects.  
Regulatory focus theory predicts that individuals who enact strategies (i.e., 
an eagerness strategy) that aligns with the general orientation of the role they 
occupy (i.e., a job candidate looking to maximize their starting salary) will exhibit 
increased feelings of fit (Appelt & Higgins, 2010). The exact mechanism through 
which the influence of regulatory fit increases negotiated outcomes is theorized to 
be due to one’s enhanced ability to focus on aspiration value, which provides an 
anchoring effect and increases resistance to making concessions (Galinsky et al., 
2001). In the current study, participants in the eagerness strategy condition did not 
experience significantly greater fit with their role (i.e., higher average “gain 
frame” scores) compared to participants in the control condition. The enactment 
of any strategy likely enhances feelings of fit with one’s negotiator role as it 
focuses attention on behaviors that are expected to result in positive outcomes. 
The current study did not replicate a previously found gender difference in 
chronic prevention focus, although women were slightly more prevention focused 
compared to men (Appelt et al., 2009). Chronic prevention focus was also un-
related to anticipated backlash, first offers, final negotiated salary, and negotiation 
satisfaction. Salary negotiations represent “strong” situations whereby norms for 
behavior wash out individual differences such as chronic prevention focus. The 
development of an eagerness strategy may further reinforce certain negotiation 
behavior. Therefore, whether someone is chronically prevention or promotion 
focused is not as relevant as is the type of strategy (eagerness or vigilance) and 
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associated behaviors that are the strongest determinant of success in salary 
negotiations. 
There was no statistically significant interaction between gender and 
experimental condition on final negotiated salary, first offer, or negotiation 
satisfaction. However, men still statistically significantly outperformed women in 
the negotiation. Men outperformed women by an average of $1,375.89 in the 
eagerness condition. Men outperformed women by an average of $1,983.33 in the 
control condition. This may be driven in part by the fact that men made 
significantly higher first offers compared to women (see Table 3). Previous 
research has demonstrated that first offer values explain a significant amount of 
variance in final negotiated outcomes such as salary (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 
2001). Therefore, the effect of the gender difference in first offer value likely 
exacerbated gender differences in final negotiated salary. Additionally, this 
finding confirms existing research on gender differences in negotiation, which 
shows there is a small but persistent performance effect in favor of men in 
negotiation (Mazei et al., 2015). In particular, men tend to outperform women in 
single-issue negotiations (Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999). From a role congruity 
perspective, behavioral norms in salary negotiations (e.g., making assertive offers 
or counter-offers, resisting concessions) elicit a strong association with 
masculinity (Eagly & Karau, 2002). Therefore, men who enact these behaviors in 
a salary negotiation are perceived as adhering to those norms. As a result, they 
encounter less resistance and feel emboldened to ask for more compared to 
women. In addition, the use of a male confederate in the role of the hiring 
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manager may have further strengthened the stereotypes associated with salary 
negotiations as a traditionally masculine domain. 
Although it would be ideal to “level the playing field” completely, the fact 
that the eagerness strategy produced a significant main effect on final negotiated 
salary was a positive outcome of this research. Strong contextual cues for 
acceptable negotiation behaviors were likely instigated through the instructions to 
focus on an aspiration value in the eagerness strategy. In addition, the bargaining 
range ($55,000 to over $70,000) was obvious and participants had a clear 
alternative to a negotiated agreement (i.e., job offer from another company). The 
clarity of the boundary conditions for this negotiation and power generated by the 
job candidate’s alternative likely enhanced participants’ expectations that 
negotiating assertively would lead to a high starting salary.  
Women significantly improved their negotiation outcomes in the 
eagerness strategy condition compared to the control condition (i.e., no strategy 
assigned). On average, women in the eagerness strategy condition negotiated final 
salaries that were $2,281.25 higher compared to women in the control condition. 
Although men in the eagerness strategy condition also improved relative to men 
in the control condition, it was by a smaller margin ($1,673.81) compared to the 
difference between women in each experimental condition.  
In alignment with the Backlash Avoidance Model (BAM), women who 
experienced a reduction in anticipated backlash negotiated higher starting salaries. 
The BAM suggests that the positive effect of reducing anticipated backlash stems 
from its impact on self-regulation such that attention which would typically be 
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devoted towards setting and attaining goals in a negotiation is inhibited by a 
preoccupation with avoiding negative social outcomes for enacting behaviors that 
violate gender stereotypes, such as women assertively and confidently negotiating 
for a high starting salary (Rudman et al., 2012). In the current research, it is likely 
that the clarity of expectations in terms of the focus on attaining the aspiration 
value in the eagerness condition served as a cognitive anchor, which replicates 
previous research (Galinsky et al., 2001). In addition, these situational factors 
likely reduced women’s feelings of ambiguity regarding norms for behavior. 
Previous research has found that gender effects in negotiation tend to wash out in 
contexts which clearly delineate boundary conditions such as the bargaining range 
and generate power through the strength of alternatives to a negotiated agreement 
(i.e., BATNA) (Bowles, Babcock, & McGinn, 2005; Mazei et al., 2015). In 
tandem, these factors likely contributed to women’s relative success in the 
eagerness condition compared to the control condition. 
The effect of the eagerness strategy to improve women’s negotiation 
outcomes may also be explained through role congruity theory. For female 
negotiators, gender-role incongruence in the form of occupying a role within a 
distributive negotiation setting, such as a salary negotiation, can elicit social 
backlash, inhibit women’s negotiating behavior, and diminish women’s 
negotiation performance (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010; Bear & Babcock, 2012; 
Bowles & Babcock, 2013; Bowles, Babcock, & Lai, 2007). In the present 
research, women did anticipate greater backlash compared to men, regardless of 
experimental condition (see Table 3). An eagerness strategy may implicitly cue 
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women to think about justifications that enhance the legitimacy of producing a 
higher first offer in the negotiation, such as providing concrete, objective 
examples of their accomplishments. In the present research, women did, in fact, 
report lower anticipated backlash and produced higher initial first offers in the 
eagerness condition by an average of $2,865.53 compared to women in the 
control condition. This likely provided an anchor against which the confederate 
acting as the hiring manager would base subsequent counter-offers.   
 Negotiation satisfaction was not statistically significantly influenced by 
the use of an eagerness strategy or gender, although men and participants in the 
control condition were slightly less satisfied with their negotiated outcomes 
compared to women and participants in the eagerness condition (see Table 3). 
Negotiation satisfaction was significantly, positively correlated with previous 
negotiation experience and final negotiated salary. This is dissimilar from some 
previous research which has suggested a “winner’s curse” where negotiators who 
achieve the best outcomes feel less satisfied with their negotiation outcomes 
(Curan et al., 2006). Given the experimental context of this study and the 
simplicity of the negotiation paradigm, it may more difficult to induce 
participants’ feelings of psychological realism and emotional commitment to the 
outcomes of the negotiation. Alternatively, it may be the case that enacting an 
eagerness strategy is motivating but stressful. People may use more mental 
resources and feel more stressed when adopting the eagerness strategy as it is not 
aligned with their typical approach, even though they objectively perform better 
by achieving a higher starting salary. These feelings of stress or depletion of 
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mental resources could result in similar feelings of satisfaction when compared to 
participants in control condition. 
 Ultimately, there should be no gender difference between women’s and 
men’s starting salaries (when there is commensurate previous job experience and 
other job-related factors), but the current research at least provides a starting point 
for the implementation of a motivation-focused intervention where everyone, 
especially women, can improve their salary negotiation performance by adopting 
an eagerness strategy. 
Strengths and Limitations 
 Salary negotiations represent a dynamic context, where inter-
organizational norms and expectations can vary greatly. Often, salary negotiations 
can occur through various mediums of communication over a period of time (e.g., 
over the phone, email, in person) depending on the uniqueness and significance of 
the role to an organization (e.g., entry-level versus senior leader). The current 
research was conducted using an experimental laboratory context that captured 
cross-sectional and self-reported data from a population of undergraduate students 
which limits generalizability. However, the current research is benefitted by a 
largely naïve population of negotiators. Testing an intervention that could be used 
within this population is critical to preventing small gender differences in starting 
salary from cumulating over time. Indeed, gender differences in negotiation 
performance diminish as women gain experience in negotiation settings, when the 
bargaining range is clear, and the opportunity to negotiate is presented overtly 
(Mazei et al., 2015).  
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Similarly, using a trained confederate limits the conclusions that can be 
drawn in terms of how individuals in the experimental condition may have reacted 
depending on the behavior of their counterpart. Although there was a script which 
dictated rules for the confederate’s reaction to a participant’s potential offers and 
justifications, a certain degree of improvisation was required to create a sense of 
realism. For example, confederates were instructed to resist the job candidate’s 
offer at least twice throughout the negotiation; the content of this resistance was 
not specifically scripted. In a paradigm involving two participants, impasses 
would have likely occurred more frequently (there were no impasses in the 
current study), or the participant in the job candidate role may have walked away 
given their BATNA (another job offer). However, given the largest gender effects 
typically exist in mixed-gender negotiations, finding support for several 
hypotheses in this context (female job candidates paired with a male hiring 
manager) may help women determine the best opportunity to consciously focus 
on implementing an eagerness strategy.  
An alternative explanation for the overall improvements to negotiation 
outcomes based on the enactment of an eagerness strategy may be derived from 
construal level theory. Instructing participants to outline their negotiating strategy 
explicitly (e.g., specific offers and justifications, planned reactions and 
counteroffers based on counterpart’s behavior) may instigate a higher construal 
level, i.e., a focus on interests or why negotiators want something compared to a 
low construal level focus on positions, i.e., what negotiators want. Activation of a 
high construal level has been previously shown to positively relate to integrative 
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bargaining outcomes (Wening, Keith, & Abele, 2016). It may also be the case 
within a salary negotiation that an eagerness strategy activates a high construal 
level for the negotiator, and forces them to think from the perspective of a hiring 
manager about providing justifications that demonstrate why they deserve a 
certain salary. 
Lastly, the definition of the current experimental manipulation as an 
inducement of a participant’s promotion focus or orientation to achieve gains may 
conceptually overlap with goal-setting theory such that the explicit instructions in 
the eagerness strategy condition could alternatively be interpreted as instructions 
to set a specific goal (i.e., aspiration salary value) and set a strategy to achieve 
that goal, which specifies the means through which one will achieve an 
instrumental negotiation outcome such as starting salary. Although this is 
possible, the overarching conclusions of this research remain the same and should 
focus on the positive benefits of enacting the eagerness strategy in salary 
negotiations. 
Implications and Future Directions 
 The current research supports the value of a regulatory focus intervention 
that could be easily implemented within organizations who utilize salary 
negotiations in order to aid in improving the likelihood that male and female job 
candidates will be able to achieve starting salaries that are more equitable. 
Women, especially those with little previous negotiation experience, can improve 
their negotiation outcomes by consciously employing strategies to focus their 
attention on their aspiration value in salary negotiations. Importantly, this was 
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shown to result in higher first offers, better negotiated outcomes, and reduced 
feelings of anticipated social backlash for negotiating compared to using no 
particular strategy.  
This study also provides additional evidence to support the existing literature 
on gender differences in negotiation, and provided a novel theoretical application 
of regulatory focus theory in the form of an intervention, adding to the existing 
evidence-based recommendations to improve women’s negotiation outcomes. 
Future experimental research should replicate and extend the use of the 
eagerness strategy with participants rather than confederates in the hiring manager 
role. It may be the case that there are interesting interactions between a job 
candidate and hiring manager’s gender such that women may be more successful 
when paired with a woman hiring manager compared to a man due to further 
reductions in anticipated backlash for negotiating assertively as has been 
suggested by previous research (Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013). Additionally, it 
would be important to determine whether the eagerness strategy intervention 
influences experienced backlash. For example, women who use an eagerness 
strategy may anticipate less backlash and negotiate higher salaries at the expense 
of experienced backlash in the form of a hiring manager’s perceptions of her 
likability. Downstream effects of decreased likability may influence women’s 
advancement in the workplace or at least hinder their initial reputation when they 
are starting out in a new job as has been demonstrated by previous research 
(Williams & Tiedans, 2015). 
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Given that many organizations require job candidates to report their previous 
salary, it is likely that the eagerness strategy intervention is less impactful when a 
hiring manager possesses this knowledge. Therefore, replications of this research 
within professional samples should factor this into research design. Additionally, 
organizational samples would likely increase the importance of age and previous 
negotiation experience on negotiation outcomes, and should therefore be taken 
into consideration. 
The present research focused exclusively on main effects and interactions of 
the eagerness intervention and gender on negotiation outcomes. Future research 
could benefit from integrating the use of negotiation process variables such as 
number of concessions, and the use and content of justifications to better 
understand the influence of using an eagerness strategy to improve negotiation 
outcomes. Perhaps the use of an eagerness strategy increases resistance to 
concessions and improves the quality of justifications through the planning 
process that is employed. 
Lastly, it will be important for future research to examine how the use of 
multiple interventions could equalize women’s negotiation outcomes. For 
example, women who use an eagerness strategy as well as emphasize an advocacy 
role (c.f., Amanatullah & Morris, 2010) could achieve better negotiation 
outcomes compared to using either tactic alone. 
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Appendix A. Informed Consent Form – Psychology Research Pool and Non-
Research Pool 
ADULT CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH – Research Pool 
 
Starting a New Job Study 
 
Principal Investigator: Mary Keegin, M.A., Graduate Student 
 
Institution: DePaul University, Chicago, Illinois, USA 
 
Department (School, College): Psychology, College of Science and Health 
 
Faculty Advisor: Alice Stuhlmacher, Ph.D., Psychology, College of Science and Health 
 
What is the purpose of this research? 
We are asking you to be in a research study because we are trying to learn more about how people 
interact when discussing terms of employment such as salary.  This study is being conducted by 
Mary Keegin, M.A., a graduate student at DePaul University as a requirement to obtain her 
Doctoral degree. This research is being supervised by her faculty advisor, Alice Stuhlmacher, 
Ph.D. There may be other people on the research team assisting with the study. 
 
We hope to include about 130 people in the research. 
 
Why are you being asked to be in the research? 
You are invited to participate in this study because you can speak, read, and write fluently in English. 
You must be age 18 or older to be in this study. This study is not approved for the enrollment of 
people under the age of 18. 
 
What is involved in being in the research study? 
If you agree to be in this study, being in the research involves engaging in a salary negotiation as a 
specific type of interaction. We are interested in people’s behavior and how they perceive 
themselves and others in these situations.  
 
This is the procedure for the study. 
• First, you will complete a questionnaire on a computer that contains items asking about 
your life experiences and how confident you are using different tactics in negotiations. 
• Next, you will read detailed instructions and information concerning a salary negotiation 
and your priorities taking on the role of a job candidate. You will be asked to plan your 
strategy and write it down for review by the research team. 
• After this, you will complete a questionnaire on a computer about your planned goals and 
expectations of your counterpart. 
• Then you will negotiate with your counterpart in person, who is another student taking on 
the role of a hiring manager.  
• Finally, you will receive another questionnaire on a computer that will ask your about 
your experiences from the negotiation in terms of how satisfied you felt with your 
outcomes, how the negotiation process went, how your counterpart behaved, how 
confident you feel following the negotiation, your perceptions of your counterpart, and 
demographic items (gender, ethnicity, age, and previous negotiation experience).  
 
Importantly, all data in this study will be kept confidential. Your name will not be stored in a way 
that can be linked to the data. Furthermore, all data will only be used for research purposes. You 
have been randomly assigned (with a random number generator) to one of two groups. In order to 
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not influence you before or during the negotiation, we will tell you more about the different 
conditions at the end of the experiment.  
 
How much time will this take? 
This study will take about 60 minutes of your time in total. 
 
• The first part of the study, which includes the questionnaires, reading the negotiation 
instructions, and planning your strategy, will take approximately 30 minutes. 
• You will have time to negotiate with your counterpart for up to 15 minutes.   
• The final set of questionnaire items will take approximately 15 minutes to complete. 
 
Are there any risks involved in participating in this study? 
Being in this study does not involve any risks other than what you would encounter in daily life.  
As in your daily interactions, you may feel unsure about the best course of action in negotiating or 
uncomfortable about answering certain questions. You do not have to answer any question you do 
not want to.  
    
Are there any benefits to participating in this study? 
You will not personally benefit from participating in this study. 
 
We hope that what we learn will help other researchers, negotiators, employees, and policy makers 
in improving equity in salary negotiations.  
 
Is there any kind of payment, reimbursement or credit for being in this study? 
You will be given 1.5 psychology subject pool credits for participation in the research. At the end 
of the survey you will be asked to write down your subject pool number. You must provide your 
subject pool number in order to be given credit. 
 
Are there any costs to me for being in the research? 
You are responsible for any costs related to getting to and from the location where you will 
participate in the research. 
 
Can you decide not to participate?   
Your participation is voluntary, which means you can choose not to participate.  There will be no 
negative consequences, penalties, or loss of benefits if you decide not to participate or change your 
mind later and withdraw from the research after you begin participating. Your decision whether or 
not to be in the research will not affect your standing with DePaul University. 
   
Who will see my study information and how will the confidentiality of the information collected 
for the research be protected? 
The research records will be kept and stored securely. Your information will be combined with 
information from other people taking part in the study. When we write about the study or publish a 
paper to share the research with other researchers, we will write about the combined information 
we have gathered. We will not include your name or any information that will directly identify 
you. We will make every effort to prevent anyone who is not on the research team from knowing 
that you gave us information, or what that information is.  However, some people might review or 
copy our records that may identify you in order to make sure we are following the required rules, 
laws, and regulations.  For example, the DePaul University Institutional Review Board may audit 
the files.  If they look at our records, they will keep your information confidential.  
 
Who should be contacted for more information about the research? 
Before you decide whether to accept this invitation to take part in the study, please ask any 
questions that might come to mind now.  Later, if you have questions, suggestions, concerns, or 
complaints about the study or you want to get additional information or provide input about this 
research, you can contact the researcher, Mary Keegin, mkeegin@depaul.edu or Dr. Stuhlmacher, 
astuhlma@depaul.edu, 773-325-2050 in the Psychology department of DePaul University.  
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This research has been reviewed and approved by the DePaul Institutional Review Board (IRB). If 
you have questions about your rights as a research subject you may contact Susan Loess-Perez, 
DePaul University’s Director of Research Compliance, in the Office of Research Services at 312-
362-7593 or by email at sloesspe@depaul.edu.   
 
You may also contact DePaul’s Office of Research Services if: 
 
• Your questions, concerns, or complaints are not being answered by the research team. 
• You cannot reach the research team. 
• You want to talk to someone besides the research team. 
 
You will be given a copy of this information to keep for your records. 
 
Statement of Consent from the Subject:   
 
I have read the above information.  I have had all my questions and concerns answered. By signing 
below, I indicate my consent to be in the research.  
 
Signature:_______________________________________________  
 
 
Printed name: ____________________________________________ 
 
 
Date: _________________ 
 
 
ADULT CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH – Non-Research Pool 
 
Starting a New Job Study 
 
Principal Investigator: Mary Keegin, M.A., Graduate Student 
 
Institution: DePaul University, Chicago, Illinois, USA 
 
Department (School, College): Psychology, College of Science and Health 
 
Faculty Advisor: Alice Stuhlmacher, Ph.D., Psychology, College of Science and Health 
 
What is the purpose of this research? 
We are asking you to be in a research study because we are trying to learn more about how people 
interact when discussing terms of employment such as salary.  This study is being conducted by 
Mary Keegin, M.A., a graduate student at DePaul University as a requirement to obtain her 
Doctoral degree. This research is being supervised by her faculty advisor, Alice Stuhlmacher, 
Ph.D. There may be other people on the research team assisting with the study. 
 
We hope to include about 130 people in the research. 
 
Why are you being asked to be in the research? 
You are invited to participate in this study because you can speak, read, and write fluently in English. 
You must be age 18 or older to be in this study. This study is not approved for the enrollment of 
people under the age of 18. 
 
What is involved in being in the research study? 
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If you agree to be in this study, being in the research involves engaging in a salary negotiation as a 
specific type of interaction. We are interested in people’s behavior and how they perceive 
themselves and others in these situations.  
 
This is the procedure for the study. 
• First, you will complete a questionnaire on a computer that contains items asking about 
your life experiences and how confident you are using different tactics in negotiations. 
• Next, you will read detailed instructions and information concerning a salary negotiation 
and your priorities taking on the role of a job candidate. You will be asked to plan your 
strategy and write it down for review by the research team. 
• After this, you will complete a questionnaire on a computer about your planned goals and 
expectations of your counterpart. 
• Then you will negotiate with your counterpart in person, who is another student taking on 
the role of a hiring manager.  
• Finally, you will receive another questionnaire on a computer that will ask your about 
your experiences from the negotiation in terms of how satisfied you felt with your 
outcomes, how the negotiation process went, how your counterpart behaved, how 
confident you feel following the negotiation, your perceptions of your counterpart, and 
demographic items (gender, ethnicity, age, and previous negotiation experience).  
 
Importantly, all data in this study will be kept confidential. Your name will not be stored in a way 
that can be linked to the data. Furthermore, all data will only be used for research purposes. You 
have been randomly assigned (with a random number generator) to one of two groups. In order to 
not influence you before or during the negotiation, we will tell you more about the different 
conditions at the end of the experiment.  
 
How much time will this take? 
This study will take about 60 minutes of your time in total. 
 
• The first part of the study, which includes the questionnaires, reading the negotiation 
instructions, and planning your strategy, will take approximately 30 minutes. 
• You will have time to negotiate with your counterpart for up to 15 minutes.   
• The final set of questionnaire items will take approximately 15 minutes to complete. 
 
Are there any risks involved in participating in this study? 
Being in this study does not involve any risks other than what you would encounter in daily life.  
As in your daily interactions, you may feel unsure about the best course of action in negotiating or 
uncomfortable about answering certain questions. You do not have to answer any question you do 
not want to.  
    
Are there any benefits to participating in this study? 
You will not personally benefit from participating in this study. 
 
We hope that what we learn will help other researchers, negotiators, employees, and policy makers 
in improving equity in salary negotiations.  
 
Is there any kind of payment, reimbursement or credit for being in this study? 
You will receive $10 as an Amazon gift card for completing the study.  
 
Are there any costs to me for being in the research? 
You are responsible for any costs related to getting to and from the location where you will 
participate in the research. 
 
Can you decide not to participate?   
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Your participation is voluntary, which means you can choose not to participate.  There will be no 
negative consequences, penalties, or loss of benefits if you decide not to participate or change your 
mind later and withdraw from the research after you begin participating. Your decision whether or 
not to be in the research will not affect your standing with DePaul University. 
   
Who will see my study information and how will the confidentiality of the information collected 
for the research be protected? 
The research records will be kept and stored securely. Your information will be combined with 
information from other people taking part in the study. When we write about the study or publish a 
paper to share the research with other researchers, we will write about the combined information 
we have gathered. We will not include your name or any information that will directly identify 
you. We will make every effort to prevent anyone who is not on the research team from knowing 
that you gave us information, or what that information is.  However, some people might review or 
copy our records that may identify you in order to make sure we are following the required rules, 
laws, and regulations.  For example, the DePaul University Institutional Review Board may audit 
the files.  If they look at our records, they will keep your information confidential.  
 
Who should be contacted for more information about the research? 
Before you decide whether to accept this invitation to take part in the study, please ask any 
questions that might come to mind now.  Later, if you have questions, suggestions, concerns, or 
complaints about the study or you want to get additional information or provide input about this 
research, you can contact the researcher, Mary Keegin, mkeegin@depaul.edu or Dr. Stuhlmacher, 
astuhlma@depaul.edu, 773-325-2050 in the Psychology department of DePaul University.  
 
This research has been reviewed and approved by the DePaul Institutional Review Board (IRB). If 
you have questions about your rights as a research subject you may contact Susan Loess-Perez, 
DePaul University’s Director of Research Compliance, in the Office of Research Services at 312-
362-7593 or by email at sloesspe@depaul.edu.   
 
You may also contact DePaul’s Office of Research Services if: 
 
• Your questions, concerns, or complaints are not being answered by the research team. 
• You cannot reach the research team. 
• You want to talk to someone besides the research team. 
 
You will be given a copy of this information to keep for your records. 
 
Statement of Consent from the Subject:   
 
I have read the above information.  I have had all my questions and concerns answered. By signing 
below, I indicate my consent to be in the research.  
 
Signature:_______________________________________________  
 
 
Printed name: ____________________________________________ 
 
 
Date: _________________ 
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Appendix B. Confederate Script and Payoff Table 
Confederate Script – Starting a New Job Study 
Instructions: 
 
Introduce yourself to the participant. 
 
You should try to elicit a first offer from the participant; say “I would like to start by hearing you 
discuss your desired starting salary.” 
 
Confederate hiring managers will always open with the same starting offer of $55,000 (no 
justification), but ONLY IF participants are exceptionally resistant to making the first offer.  
 
If the counterpart asks for justification about your initial offer, reply “This is the standard starting 
salary for this position at A&B Inc.” 
First counter-offer 
 
1.      If the participant immediately counters with no justification, ask: 
 
“Can you tell me a little bit more about why you think our company would benefit from paying 
you that amount?” 
 
2.      If the counterpart counters with a legitimate justification (see examples on next page), 
make a concession to $58,000. 
 
Concede $2,000 if participants require prompting for a legitimate justification 
 
If the participant asks you for justification based on your counter-offer, reply “A&B Inc. has a 
salary range they are willing to offer new hires in this position, and I think this amount is fair 
given that you are a recent college graduate with little previous work experience.” 
 
Remaining counter-offers 
 
3.      If the participant justifies their previous offer with the same justification (no elaboration 
or additional details) or a justification that is mixed or irrelevant (e.g., needing to pay off 
their debts), resist them. 
a.      For subsequent counter-offers where the participant provides a new, legitimate 
justification, increase the offer by $2,000. 
 
4.      If the participant does NOT provide justification or any other reasoning, or simply 
reiterates the previous offer, state 
 
“I’d like to hear why you feel you’re worth $X (whatever the participant’s offer is)”. 
 
If, after prompting, the participant provides justification, increase the offer by $1,000. 
 
For subsequent counter-offers with NO justification, resist the offer. Then, prompt the participant 
about why they feel they are worth that amount and increase the offer by $1,000 only if they 
continue providing reasonable justifications or they elaborate on previous justifications (i.e., not 
just “because that’s what I want”). 
 
First Offer 
With justification $3,000 
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Justifies after prompting $2,000 
Remaining Offers 
Legitimate justification $2,000 
Justifies after prompting OR 
reiterates same justification, 
with additional detail 
$1,000 
Reiterates same justification (no 
additional detail) 
Resist 
Mixed justification Resist 
Irrelevant justification Resist 
  
 Responses to various justifications 
 
Utilize at least two of these responses (not listed in any particular order) to resist the participant’s 
continued counter-offers: 
Legitimate Participant Justifications Confederate Response 
 ·        Graduated from prestigious university ·        We adjust our offers based on the cost of 
living in the area 
·        High cost of living expenses ·        We usually re-negotiate your pay after the 
first year depending on good performance 
(AVOID) 
·        Heard of offers up to $70k ·        Offers are made based on the market value 
and what competitors in the area are offering 
·        Increased job commitment/satisfaction 
  
·        A&B Inc. expects that you will have an 
excellent opportunity to launch your career at 
this salary 
·        Feels market value is higher than what is 
being offered 
·        I am required by A&B Inc. to agree to 
salaries within specific ranges for new 
employees at your level 
·        Has received a job offer from another 
organization 
·        I just don’t know if that salary accurately 
reflects your level of education and previous 
experience 
  
Examples of illegitimate participant justifications: 
·        Something they make up that is unrelated to job-relevant skills or experience (e.g., childcare 
expenses, health issues and related expenses) 
·        Based on their information, but is not job-related (e.g., need to pay off their debt)  
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Appendix C. Regulatory Focus Questionnaire (Higgins et al., 2001) 
Event Reaction Questionnaire 
 
Instructions: This set of questions asks you how frequently specific events 
actually occur or have occurred in your life.   
 
 
1. Compared to most people, are you 
typically unable to get what you 
want out of life? 
1 2 3 4 5 
never        sometimes          very 
or seldom           often 
 
 7. Do you often do well at different things 
that you try? 
1 2 3 4 5 
never        sometimes          very often 
or seldom  
2. Growing up, would you ever “cross 
the line” by doing things that your 
parents would not tolerate? 
1 2 3 4 5 
never       sometimes     very often 
or seldom  
 8. Not being careful enough has gotten me 
into trouble at times. 
1 2 3 4 5 
never        sometimes          very often 
or seldom  
3. How often have you accomplished 
things that got you "psyched" to 
work even harder? 
1 2 3 4 5 
never        sometimes     very often 
or seldom  
 9. When it comes to achieving things that 
are important to me, I find that I don't 
perform as well as I ideally would like 
to do.   
1 2 3 4 5   
never            sometimes          very 
 true                true              true 
 
4. Did you get on your parents’ nerves 
often when you were growing up? 
1 2 3 4 5 
never        sometimes     very often 
or seldom  
 10. I feel like I have made progress toward 
being successful in my life. 
      1       2      3      4          5 
certainly                          certainly 
    false                                          true 
 
5. How often did you obey rules and 
regulations that were established by 
your parents? 
1 2 3 4 5 
   never         sometimes     very often 
or seldom 
 
 11. I have found very few hobbies or 
activities in my life that capture my 
interest or motivate me to put effort into 
them. 
     1    2  3        4          5 
certainly                    certainly 
    false                                    true 
 
6. Growing up, did you ever act in 
ways that your parents thought were 
objectionable? 
1 2 3 4 5 
never       sometimes     very often 
or seldom 
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Appendix D. Negotiation Self-Efficacy Scale (Sullivan et al., 2006) 
 
Instructions: Please rate the extent to which you feel confident you could enact 
the following behaviors in the upcoming negotiation on a scale of 0=not confident 
at all to 100=completely confident. 
 
1. Persuade the other negotiator to make most of the concessions. 
2. Convince the other negotiator to agree with you. 
3. Gain the upper hand against the other negotiator. 
4. Prevent the other negotiator from exploiting your weaknesses. 
5. Establish rapport with the other negotiator. 
6. Find tradeoffs with the other negotiator. 
7. Exchange concessions with the other negotiator. 
8. Maximize the interests of the other negotiator and yourself. 
*First 4 items constitute Distributive Self-Efficacy and the last 4 make up 
Integrative Self-Efficacy 
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Appendix E. Negotiation Simulation and Regulatory Strategy Prime 
(adapted from Galinsky et al. 2002) 
Instructions: You will have ten minutes to read through the information 
concerning the upcoming negotiation and prepare a strategy.  
You are taking on the role of a job candidate that is finalizing the terms of 
employment with an organization, A&B Inc., from whom you have received a job 
offer. You are a recent graduate of a prestigious university and already have an 
offer from another well-respected organization in your field with a starting salary 
of $55,000. You are very interested in negotiating for a starting salary of at least 
$60,000 since you must pay for living expenses that are higher in the city where 
the A&B Inc. is located, and you are trying to pay off your debt within five years 
by making higher payments per month. You have also recently heard that salaries 
of up to $70,000 have been offered to others in your field.  
Today, you will get fifteen minutes to negotiate with A&B Inc.’s hiring manager 
about your starting salary. Think about your goal for the upcoming negotiation by 
identifying your target value (i.e., the salary you would ideally like to settle on), 
your reservation value (i.e., the lowest salary you would be willing to agree to), 
and your aspiration value (i.e., the highest salary you feel the hiring manager 
would still agree to). 
Eagerness Strategy:  
Negotiators also use strategies to prepare and to negotiate. Today you will 
use an eagerness strategy. To do this, think about the different ways you could 
maximize your gains in the negotiation. You are asked to concentrate on the 
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highest salary you could attain. Therefore, during the negotiation, you should 
focus your efforts on attaining a salary of $70,000, or the highest salary you have 
heard of someone attaining at your level of experience in your field. Your strategy 
can include specific offers or behaviors you think are effective depending on how 
you expect your counterpart to behave.  
Think about how you could apply this strategy and briefly describe your 
strategy using the space provided. Feel free to use another sheet of paper to write 
notes if you'd like. 
Control Condition: Negotiators use strategies to prepare and to negotiate. 
Strategies can include specific offers or behaviors you think are effective 
depending on how you expect your counterpart to behave. Consider referencing 
your target value, reservation value, and aspiration value when creating your 
strategy. 
Think about how you could apply your strategy and briefly describe your 
strategy using the space provided. Feel free to use another sheet of paper to write 
notes if you'd like. 
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Appendix F. Manipulation Check Items and Anticipated Backlash  
 
Perceived Fit (Appelt & Higgins, 2009) 
Instructions: Please rate the extent to which you view the upcoming negotiation 
as a chance to: 
 
1. Create value 
2. Minimize losses 
3. Attain resources 
4. Maintain resources 
 
7 point Likert-type scale (1= “Strongly Disagree”, 7= “Strongly Agree”) 
 
Anticipated Backlash (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010) 
Instructions: Based on the instructions for your role in the upcoming negotiation, 
please indicate a dollar value in reaction to the following items: 
 
1. How much do you think you can reasonably ask for without the hiring 
manager’s perceiving you to be a pushy person?  
2. How much do you think you can reasonably ask for without causing the 
hiring manager to punish you for being too demanding? 
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Appendix G. Subjective Value Inventory (Curhan et al., 2006) 
 
General Instructions:  For each question, please circle a number from 1-7 that 
most accurately reflects your opinion.  You will notice that some of the questions 
are similar to one another; this is primarily to ensure the validity and reliability of 
the questionnaire.  Please simply answer each question independently, without 
reference to any of the other questions.  
 
Important:  If you encounter a particular question that is not applicable to your 
negotiation, simply circle “NA.”  Even if you did not reach agreement, please try 
to answer as many questions as possible. 
 
Instrumental Outcome 
1. How satisfied are you with your own outcome—i.e., the extent to which the 
terms of your agreement (or lack of agreement) benefit you? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
Not at 
all 
  Moderately   Perfectly  
2. How satisfied are you with the balance between your own outcome and your 
counterpart(s)’s outcome(s)? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
Not at 
all 
  Moderately   Perfectly  
3. Did you feel like you forfeited or “lost” in this negotiation?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
Not at 
all 
  Moderately   A great 
deal 
 
4. Do you think the terms of your agreement are consistent with principles of 
legitimacy or objective criteria (e.g., common standards of fairness, precedent, 
industry practice, legality, etc.)? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
Not at 
all 
  Moderately   Perfectly  
 
Self 
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5. Did you “lose face” (i.e., damage your sense of pride) in the negotiation?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
Not at 
all 
  Moderately   A great 
deal 
 
6. Did this negotiation make you feel more or less competent as a negotiator? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
It made 
me feel 
less 
competent 
  It did not 
make me 
feel more 
or less 
competent 
  It made 
me feel 
more 
competent 
 
7. Did you behave according to your own principles and values? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
Not at 
all 
  Moderately   Perfectly  
8. Did this negotiation positively or negatively impact your self-image (your 
impression of yourself)? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
It 
negatively 
impacted 
my self-
image 
  It did not 
positively 
or 
negatively 
impact 
my self-
image 
  It 
positively 
impacted 
my self-
image 
 
Process 
9. Do you feel your counterpart(s) listened to your concerns? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
Not at 
all 
  Moderately   Perfectly  
10. Would you characterize the negotiation process as fair? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
Not at 
all 
  Moderately   Perfectly  
11. How satisfied are you with the ease (or difficulty) of reaching an agreement? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
Not at all 
satisfied 
  Moderately 
satisfied 
  Perfectly 
satisfied 
 
12. Did your counterpart(s) consider your wishes, opinions, or needs? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
Not at 
all 
  Moderately   Perfectly  
 
Relationship 
13. What kind of “overall” impression did your counterpart(s) make on you? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
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Extremely 
negative 
  Neither 
negative 
nor 
positive 
  Extremely 
positive 
 
14. How satisfied are you with your relationship with your counterpart(s) as a 
result of this negotiation? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
Not at 
all 
  Moderately   Perfectly  
15. Did the negotiation make you trust your counterpart(s)? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
Not at 
all 
  Moderately   Perfectly  
16. Did the negotiation build a good foundation for a future relationship with your 
counterpart(s)? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
Not at 
all 
  Moderately   Perfectly  
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Appendix H. Experienced Backlash (Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013) 
 
Instructions: Please use the following scale to rate these items: 
 
1= “Not at all”  2 3 4 5 6 7= “Extremely”  
 
1. How interested would you be in working with your counterpart at 
[organization]? 
2. If you were the project manager on a work assignment, how likely would 
you be to ask your counterpart to be part of the project team? 
3. Is your counterpart the type of person you like to work with? 
4. How interested would you be in interacting socially with your 
counterpart? 
5. If your counterpart invited you out for a fun activity after work, how likely 
would you be to go with her/him? 
6. Is your counterpart the type of person you like to socialize with? 
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Appendix I. Demographic Items 
 
1. What is your gender? Male=0, Female=1 
2. What is your ethnicity? White=1, Black/African American=2, Hispanic=3, 
Asian=4, Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander=5, Two or more races=6 
3. What is your age? Continuous numerical response 
4. Please rate the extent to which you have previous experience in 
negotiations. 1=“No previous experience”, 2=“Little experience”, 
3=“Some experience”, 4=“Quite a bit of experience”, or 5=“Extensive 
experience” 
  
92 
 
Appendix J. Participant Debriefing Information 
Debriefing Information 
 
The purpose of the present study is to test an intervention to reduce gender differences in salary 
negotiation outcomes, and examine other factors that may impact the effectiveness of the 
intervention. For example, one of our hypotheses states that priming individuals to view a salary 
negotiation in gain framing terms (e.g., viewing the negotiation as an opportunity rather than an 
obligation), or a “promotion focus”, may reduce previously observed gender differences in salary 
negotiations. Specifically, we are interested in examining how women may improve their salary 
negotiation outcomes and feel more satisfied with their negotiated outcomes if they are primed to 
adopt a promotion focus in a salary negotiation compared to a control group.  
 
We randomly assigned participants to a neutral condition or a priming condition for regulatory 
focus, where individuals in the neutral condition simply developed a strategy of any kind for 
achieving their desired salary, and individuals in the priming (or “promotion focus”) condition 
developed a specific strategy aimed at framing the negotiation in terms of gains to maximize their 
final negotiated salary.  
 
We also used deception in this research. You were told you were negotiating with another student 
taking on the role of the hiring manager in the negotiation. You were actually negotiating with a 
trained confederate. We did not inform you of this prior to the negotiation in order to remove the 
possibility that your behavior and responses to survey items would be impacted by this knowledge 
in a way that would confound the experimental manipulation. 
 
We hope that this research will aid in establishing support for recommendations to organizations, 
individuals, and policy makers to improve salary negotiation equity. Your participation is greatly 
needed and appreciated in order for this to be accomplished. We ask that you do not share the 
details of the study with other individuals who may participate in order to ensure the accuracy and 
honesty of the responses. 
 
You no doubt understand that it is important to have a similar environment for everyone who 
participates in the study.  Because of this, we ask your help in not revealing information about this 
study to others who may be involved or might participate in this study in the future. This is very 
important so that we are able to compare across people and so participants enter the study with the 
same information. 
 
If you would like to know more information about the theories supporting the present research, see 
the following published research articles, available to current DePaul students through PsychInfo 
on the library website: 
 
Mazei, J., Hüffmeier, J., Freund, P. A., Stuhlmacher, A. F., Bilke, L., & Hertel, G. (2015). A meta-
analysis on gender differences in negotiation outcomes and their 
moderators. Psychological Bulletin, 141(1), 85. 
 
Rudman, L. A., Moss-Racusin, C. A., Glick, P., & Phelan, J. E. (2012). 4 reactions to vanguards: 
Advances in backlash theory. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 45, 167-226. 
 
If you want a paper copy of this debriefing, please ask the experimenter. If you would like to know 
more information or have any questions about the research, feel free to contact the primary 
investigator on the project: 
 
Mary M. Keegin, M.A. 
Doctoral Candidate 
2219 N. Kenmore Ave. 
Chicago, IL 60614 
(616)-502-8742 
mkeegin@depaul.edu 
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Figure 1. Main effect of strategy on final negotiated salary 
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Figure 2. Main effect of strategy on first offer 
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Figure 3. Interaction of gender and strategy on final negotiated salary 
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Figure 4. Interaction of gender and strategy on first offer 
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